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Abstract
In post-conflict transitions, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration have played a
crucial role in the treatment of former combatants and the advancement of peacebuilding. This
peacebuilding process, known as DDR, has experienced successes and failures throughout its
implementation across the globe. Specifically, as conflict erupted across many nations in Central
and Eastern Africa, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs that were
implemented during different nations’ peacebuilding transition towards at the turn of the twentyfirst century experienced variations among their success at reducing or halting conflict. This
investigation analyzes the factors that contribute to the ability for disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration programs to successfully reduce conflict by examining the implementation of
these systems in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1997 to 2012.
The factors analyzed in this study include the time it takes to implement disarmament, the
amount of parties that commit to the peace agreement, the robustness of reintegration and
vocational training curriculum, and the amount of funding that each program receives.
Throughout this comparative analysis, these factors demonstrate to influence the success of
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, however, some of these variables are
more influential to the success than others.
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Chapter One
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Eastern and Central Africa
In the wake of the Rwandan Genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front began demanding for
a national identity to unite the country after tragedy. The Rwandan Patriotic Front took hold of
the government, and as a result nearly two million Hutus fled to Zaire, presently referred to as
the Democratic Republic of Congo.1 As the perpetrators of the genocide, members of the Hutu
ethnic group spilled over into refugee camps in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic
Republic of Congo to escape retribution by the Rwandan Patriotic Forces, bringing violence,
instability, extreme poverty, and the memory of massacre across the border of the Democratic
Republic of Congo.2 These Hutu refugees sought asylum in the Democratic Republic of Congo
in camps established by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees like Mugunga,
where the extremists were naively recognized by the UNHCR as the leaders of the camp and
deemed in charge of its governance and food supply.3 Initially, Mugunga harbored Hutu refugees
and members of the Interahamwe Militia, but their prolonged presence in the Democratic
Republic of Congo brought war with the Rwandan Patriotic Front, resulting in a persisting war
that divided support among Central and Eastern African countries between Rwanda and the
Congolese.4 The Hutus that were guilty of perpetrating the the genocide were eventually killed
or fled the Eastern Congo as a result of the war, however, despite these changes Mugunga

Howard Adelman, “The Use and Abuse of Refugees in Zaire: April 1996 to March 1997,” Refugee Manipulation:
War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering (1999).
1

2

Chris McGreal, “The Roots of the War in the Eastern Congo,” The Guardian, May 15, 2008.

Sudarsan Raghavan, “In Traumatic Arc of a Refugee Camp, Cong’s War Runs Deep,” The Washington Post,
November 3, 2013.
3

4

McGreal, “The Roots of the War in the Eastern Congo.”
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remains. Today, Mugunga houses Congolese refugees who are survivors of violence and unrest
in surrounding regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Eastern Kivu Province, where
over seventy militant groups threaten the stability of the region as they seek to control townships,
resources, and political power. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, much like its neighboring
countries of Rwanda and Burundi, the conflicts that raged through the 1990s left millions of
people displaced and struggling to meet their basic needs well into the twenty-first century.5
Those living in Mugunga have yet to see a future without the refugee camp as their home.
Within the borders of the encampment, tents are made into restaurants, carpenter and tailoring
businesses, and bars. At night, women and children sleep in fear of sexual violence and attacks
from members of militias in the surrounding areas.6 As fighting in surrounding regions surge,
influxes of displaced populations flush into the camps resulting in furthered limited resources
like food, water, and goods necessary to meet the basic needs of many Congolese. The
Congolese living in Mugunga are not just victim to the violence that was incited by the displaced
Hutu rebel groups like the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, but currently
continue to face insecurity from other well-armed militant groups like the Mai Mai militia that
have committed human rights violations as they fight for power and exploit the nation’s
expansive network of natural resources in the Kivu regions.7
One particular account that highlights the gruesome conditions of reality in the Eastern
Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo is that of Divine’s. Interviewed by the

Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terence McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and
Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo,”
African Security 2:1 (2009).
5

6

Raghavan, “In Traumatic Arc of a Refugee Camp, Cong’s War Runs Deep.”

Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the
Great Lakes.”
7
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United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Divine recounts her
survival of rape in the woods near Mugunga.
“I was walking through the forest. I was there to collect wood to be sold as charcoal in
Mugunga market. That used to be the only way for me to provide a living for my five
grandchildren and me. I was already on my way back when, suddenly, three men appeared from
nowhere. And they raped me in turn. I suppose I should be happy to be alive. But my life
changed completely. What now? I keep thinking of my grandchildren, they need me, I have to
get through this for them and for my family.”
-

Divine, 72 years old 8

To reach food and water, many of the twelve million and eight hundred thousand Congolese in
need of assistance must travel unsafe distances, exposing themselves to further threats of sexual
violence.9 Many people in the area do not see a future of peace, as organizations like the United
Nations have failed to stabilize the region despite new promises every year. Failure by the state
government and international organizations like the United Nations to hold militant groups
socially and functionally accountable and effectively disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former
combatants into the economy has resulted in the devastating reality of human suffering in the
region.10

“DRC: Women and Girls Bodies are not Battlegrounds,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, accessed December 16, 2019.
8

“DRC: Women and Girls Bodies are not Battlegrounds,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs.
9

Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the
Great Lakes.”
10
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The lives of displaced people in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo rests in
the hands of state governments as they pursue stabilization in combatant warzones and general
peace among groups. In an effort to end conflict in Eastern and Central Africa, one of the most
common peacebuilding mechanisms implemented across the region is Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration.11 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
programs are often dimensions of peace agreements that are designed to assist states in their
ability to end conflict within the confines of their borders. State governments, non-profit
organizations, and international institutions like the United Nations have programs set up across
the world to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate combatants into society to prevent future
violence and deter militants from rejoining insurgency groups through economic opportunity and
political integration.12 Known as DDR, these programs bring promises of security and early
prosperity to former militants in states where conflict has recently subsided and peacebuilding is
in its early phases. This procedure or policy is defined by the United Nations as “the process that
targets a determinant number of combatants, whether as individuals or groups, belonging to the
Armed Forces of armed opposition groups, in order to disarm, demilitarize and reintegrate these
persons into civilian life, the Armed Forces, or the police”.13 DDR programs assist in a country’s
transition towards peace and their success increases the government’s likelihood to keep peace
between parties and develop after warfare. These programs work to ensure that combatants are

Stephanie Hanson, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations,
accessed on December 1st, 2019.
11

The United Nations Peacekeeping Associated Press, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” The
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, accessed on December 6, 2019.
12

13

Angel Rabasa et al, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," From Insurgency to Stability: Volume I:
Key Capabilities and Practices, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation 2011), 52.
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fully reintegrating into civilian life, allowing for communities within warzones to build back
peace, security, and work to forward their stalled economic development.14
Although the United Nations has provided the international community with a widely
accepted definition for DDR, each step in the program serves a unique purpose that propels
communities toward peace. Each of these programs begins with disarmament, which Angel
Rabasa with the National Defense Research Institute defines as the “collection, documentation,
control, and elimination of combatant small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and
explosives.”15 Within DDR programs, disarmament focuses specifically on individual small arm
weaponry, and often includes provisions to turn in weapons to the national government or sell
them to other countries across the globe. The flow of these weapons undermines security and
stability within these specific states struggling with conflict, and their presence has proved to
serve as a factor in forced displacements, human rights violations, and casualties in conflict.16
The next step towards peacebuilding from disarmament is often demobilization, where
combatants are formally discharged from their armed forces or their armed militant groups.17
Here, former militants are taken out of society and given humanitarian assistance based on the
needs of the region at the time.18 Within this phase of the process, militants are often taught the
provisions of peace agreements and familiarize themselves with their rights within the state

14
15

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” From Insurgency to Stability, 52.
Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” From Insurgency to Stability, 53.

The United Nations Office of Disarmament Associate Press, “Small Arms,” The United Nations Office of
Disarmament, accessed December 1st, 2019.
16

17

The United Nations, Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
Standards, accessed December 6, 2019.
18

The United Nations, Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
Standards.
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before being released into civil society.19 According to Rabasa, the inclusion of all armed parties
in the peace discussions is vital to the success of DDR, as group exclusion only “addresses the
needs and concerns of only [the participating] entities.”20 Demobilization should include all
members of the specific militant groups that have agreed to the peace accords. The final step in
DDR programs, features the transition of militants from participants in conflict to their status as
members of civil society and the economy.21 Reintegration is the process by which combatants
receive vocational training and education that provide them the skills necessary to formally
integrate into the economy and earn an income outside of violence.22
Although these programs serve as peacebuilding mechanisms in post-conflict states, they
do not always prove to be effective in their ability to reduce the presence of conflict. Sometimes
programs do not always result in the reintegration of former combatants into civil society, as
some militants default back into resurgence.23 DDR programs across the globe have seen
abundant successes or infamous failures, all depending on a variety of factors and the nature of
the conflicts in the region. In Sierra Leone, Cote d’Iviore, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo, DDR programs that were implemented in 2005 were unsuccessful in their ability to
reintegrate former combatants, despite their ability to disarm over one hundred thousand
individuals.24 In these three specific countries, the Council on Foreign Relations attributes this
failure to the DDR program’s lack of funding and weaknesses in the comprehensive vocational

19
20

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 54.
Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration,” 55.

21

Hanson, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations.

22

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 54.

23

Macartan Humphreys, "Demobilization and Reintegration," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51:4 (2007): 532.

24

Hanson, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations.
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training to secure employment.25 Thus, the presence of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration in states attempting to reconcile or reconstruct due to conflict does not guarantee
stabilization.26 Instead, each factor that influences the implementation of DDR programs
contributes to the success or failure of the program as a whole. For the purpose of this project, I
will examine which aspects of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration are the most
important to the program’s ability to reduce conflict within states in Central and Eastern Africa.
By examining the factors that influence the ability for these programs to be successful at
reducing conflict in Eastern and Central Africa, international organizations and the state’s
sanctioning these programs can improve the design and implementation of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration, in an effort to stabilize these regions through their
peacebuilding transitions and end the expansive system of human suffering that is the result of
these extended periods of violence.
A. Literature Review
Various scholars in the fields of political science, international relations, and conflict
management offer different solutions as to what specific aspects of disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration programs contribute to the system’s ability to halt the presence of active
conflict. Various hypotheses provide a basic understanding of the factors that contribute to the
success of these programs, however, the knowledge regarding the long-term impact of

25

Hanson, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations.

Michael Gilligan, “Reintegration Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life: Evidence from a Quasi experiment in Burundi,”
(New York, New York: New York University Press, 2010).
26
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disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs is often limited based on the ways in
which scholars evaluate each dimension.27
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration campaigns are often implemented with
unforeseen consequences, despite their beneficial nature. Recent literature suggests that DDR
programs are not always consistent, as the program’s failure often contributes to a resurgence of
conflict or an increase in illicit activity.28 According to Angel Rabasa, author of “From
Insurgency to Stability,” disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration failed in Liberia in 2003
as the program decided to “commence weapon decommission despite the lack of accurate data
and preparation resulted in a violent reaction by the ex-combatants.”29 After 2003, the
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program in Liberia resulted in the death of nine
United Nations peacekeepers and the collection of less than fifty percent of weapons.30 Along
with this, according to Rabasa, the strict oversight of these programs is crucial to their success as
different disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs can incite increased violence
if the flow of confiscated weapons is not adequately regulated.31 Monitoring also includes the
dimension of demobilization, as demobilization camps have the opportunity to be used as
recruitment grounds for militant groups if they are kept destitute.32 Rabasa also argues that
reintegration programs must be comprehensive and they become effective when those

27

Gilligan, “Reintegration of Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life.”

28

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 78.

29

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 72.

30

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 72.

31

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 75.

32

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 74.
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implementing each program take holistic approaches to their design.33 This means that all active
parties to the conflict must be included in the DDR program as they are included in the peace
agreements.34 Rabasa’s research points to the example of the Philippines, where the state was
once struggling with but has now become a popular tourist destination in Southeast Asia as a
result of a comprehensive DDR program that included provincial governments, the national
government, the military, the police, local businesses, and community representatives.35
Although a comprehensive program is effective, Rabasa states that perhaps the biggest
factor contributing to the effectiveness of DDR in post-conflict states is their ability to raise and
maintain sufficient funding for their programs.36 If programs are not funded correctly, they
subject the region to a resurgence of violence as ex-militants might not see the benefits of
reintegration or might feel unsupported by the DDR program that has been implemented.37
Without sufficient funding, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs have
proven to be ineffective. In Angel Rabasa’s study, evidence for the argument for sufficient
funding is supported with the examples from the DDR program that began in Columbia in 2005.
In Columbia, over thirty thousand militants joined the Peace and Justice Law of 2005 that
transitions them into demobilization camps.38 The Columbian government, however, only
anticipated twelve thousand militants to be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated into civil
society so the program quickly became overwhelmed and its resources became overstretched. As

33
34

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 56.
Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 56.

35

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 56.

36

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 57.

37

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 57.

38

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 57.
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a result, Rabasa reported that over seventy five percent of the individuals who entered the
program did not receive employment, pushing many ex-combatants into militancy as they
rejoined preexisting criminal gangs. 39 Patrick Truffer, a graduate of Free University of Berlin’s
International Relations Master’s Program and member of the Swiss Armed Forces, also argues
that lack of funding is detrimental to DDR programs – citing that inadequate monetary support
for the DDR program alongside “inadequate structural prerequisites” made reintegration in the
Central African Republic “almost impossible.”40
Unlike Angel Rabasa’s or Patrick Truffer’s beliefs in the importance of funding and a
holistic approach to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, Michael J.
Gilligan argued that the success of DDR programs is dependent on a strong reintegration
component, as he believes that this is the most important step in the peacebuilding process as a
whole.41 Michael J. Gilligan, an expert in post-conflict reconstruction and a professor at New
York University, further explained that reintegration is believed to be “a critical part of the peace
process because it links the more immediate requirements of disarmament and demobilization to
the long-term imperatives of social and economic welfare.”42 Gilligan finds that the strength of
the reintegration component is the most important factor in the creation of an effective DDR
program because during conflict, combatants often do not have economic capital and often turn
towards joining militant groups or conducting unlawful activity to survive.43 As a result, if the

39

Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 57.

40

Patrick Truffer, “Successful Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” Offiziere, accessed on December
1st, 2019..

41

Gilligan, “Reintegration of Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life,” 601.

42

Gilligan, “Reintegration of Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life,” 601.

43

Gilligan, “Reintegration of Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life,” 602.
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reintegration program is not strong enough ex-militants can easily default into conflict once
again and seek economic refuge from rebel groups, thus contributing to the weakening of peace
agreements and the resurgence in violence.44 Gilligan uses Burundi’s disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration program as a case study for the effect that a strong
reintegration component has on the effectiveness of DDR as a whole. In his research, Michael J.
Gilligan found that “reintegration programs produced a significant boost to income among excombatants who would otherwise have been among the worst off, resulting in substantial
lowering of poverty incidences.”45
Michael Gilligan’s assertions on the importance of reintegration are further supported by
Mark Knight, the Executive in Residence Fellow at Geneva Centre for Security Studies. Knight
argues that former combatants pose a significant threat to the process of peacebuilding in postconflict states if they are not placing into employment opportunities.46 A combatant’s lack of
income can further increase their willingness to commit crimes and break peace accords, making
lasting peace difficult to obtain despite the absence of conflict.47 Knight’s research uses Paul
Collier’s macro-insecurity framework to further support his hypothesis, explaining that if the
“grievances and frustrations of demobilized combatants are not addressed through reintegration
strategies, former combatants can be remobilized easily and pose a security risk to the region.”48
Despite the emphasis on the importance of reintegration, Knight’s hypothesis also supports that

44

Gilligan, “Reintegration of Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life,” 602.

45

Gilligan, “Reintegration of Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life,” 617.

46

Mark Knight, "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in
Transitions from War to Peace, " Journal of Peace Research 41:4 (2004): 502.
47

Knight, “Guns, Camps and Cash,” 502.

48

Knight, “Guns, Camps and Cash,” 502.
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of Angel Rabasa, as he suggests that the coordination of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration programs through a holistic approach ensures the creation of an effective
relationship between the program and the peacebuilding process itself.49 Knight’s agreeance with
both Gilligan and Rabasa is met, however, with his suggestion that the most influential factor in
the creation of an effective DDR program is the timely implementation of the process itself.50
Knight’s final argument, and the conclusion to his research, indicates that a swift and timely
approach to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration influences the state’s ability to
pursue and implement positive peace and development after conflict.51
In No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration and Weapons Reduction in Post-Conflict Contexts, Robert Muggah argues that
DDR programs are an “intrinsic component of the post-conflict period.”52 Robert Muggah, a
Canadian Political Scientist and the Research Director of Igarape Institute, explains that DDR
programs are often disproportionately focused on disarmament and demobilization, rather than
reintegration.53 Along with this, the expectations of each program are important to their success
as ex-combatants might understand that they are receiving benefits different than those that are
actually on the table.54 In Liberia, for example, due to the program’s undereducation about the

49

Knight, “Guns, Camps and Cash,” 502.

50

Knight, “Guns, Camps and Cash,” 513.

51

Knight, “Guns, Camps and Cash,” 513.

Robert Muggah, “No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
(DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts,” The Commonwealth Journals of International Affairs 94:
374 (2005).
52

53

Muggah, “No Magic Bullet,” The Commonwealth Journals of International Affairs.

54

Muggah, “No Magic Bullet,” The Commonwealth Journals of International Affairs.
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conflict and area, soldiers rioted in the streets when they were denied certain benefits that were
not provided to them.55
Lilli Banholzer, a professor at the University of Mannheim in Political Science and Conflict
Studies, has also contributed hypotheses as to what factors influence the success of DDR
programs in their ability to deter conflict.56 In Banholzer’s research, she indicates that much of
the scholarship regarding the effectiveness of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is
focused on one of two categories: the structural components of a state, or the technical
components of the program as a whole.57 Banholzer explains that there is a correlation between
the economic and political conditions of a nation and their ability to effectively disarm,
demobilize, and reintegrate ex-combatants into society.58 Depending on the nation’s regime type
and the health of their economy at the time of peacebuilding, former combatants may be more or
less successful at reintegrating into society.59 However, Banholzer highlights the misconception
surrounding the reintegration dimension of each program, pointing out that DDR does not
change the economic development of the state as a whole, but is meant to influence individual
development within the state’s economy.60 Like Mark Knight, Banholzer argues that the timing
of the implementation of DDR programs is vital to the program’s ability to achieve its goal.
Banholzer argues that as DDR is postponed, the effectiveness of the program begins to

55
56

Muggah, “No Magic Bullet,” The Commonwealth Journals of International Affairs.
“Professor Dr. Lilli Banholzer,” The University of Mannheim, accessed on March 31, 2019.

Lilli Banholzer, “When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs Succeed?” German
Development Institute (Bonn, Germany: German Development Institute, 2014) 17.
57

58

Banholzer, “When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” 18.

59

Banholzer, “When do Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 18 – 19.

60

Banholzer, “When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” 18.
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decrease.61 However, Banholzer’s argument diverges from that of Knight’s as her research
indicates that immediate implementation is not a precondition for the program’s success, but
rather the postponement of the program’s implementation for too long is a precondition for the
ineffectiveness.62
Despite the contribution to the argument of timeliness of implementation, Lilli Banholzer
primarily focuses her research on the macro-factors that contribute to the effectiveness of DDR,
like state capacity and regime type, which are not the focus of this comparative analysis. Many
of the macro-factors that experts like Banholzer engage with in their research into the successes
and failures of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration are difficult to control for, as each
conflict has unique characteristics regarding the state’s capacity, economic development level,
regime type, geographical size, and cultural heterogeneity that influence the politics and public
opinion within the nation. Due to these macro-factors, DDR programs face different challenges
within every nation and thus should be analyzed with these regional, political, and economic
differences in mind.
For the purpose of this comparative analysis, I am interested in studying the microfactors that influence the successes and failures of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration programs in Eastern and Central African countries. The results of this investigation
can be later used to influence the development of these programs in the region as well as alter the
different policies implemented by states who sanction disarmament, demobilization, and

61

Banholzer, “When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” 23.

62

Banholzer, “When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” 23.
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reintegration programs to ensure an increased chance at their success in reducing conflict in the
region or halting it altogether.

B. Hypotheses
Through an analysis of the literature that was previously reviewed in this chapter, I predict
that the most important factor that contributes to the success of disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration programs ability to reduce conflict is a comprehensive strategy of
implementation that prioritizes all three aspects of the system holistically and equally, rather than
favoring one dimension over the others. In the pursuit to reduce or deter conflict, DDR programs
must have strong disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration dimensions so that former
combatants do not remilitarize. Although my hypothesis suggests that a holistic and
comprehensive DDR program is vital to its ability to halt conflict, within each dimension
different factors influence the system’s strength. As subsequent hypotheses, I predict the
following…
1. Disarmament programs are more likely to be successful in their contribution to deterring
conflict if they are implemented within a year after the peace agreement. Disarmament
programs are also more likely to be successful if more than a majority of arms in the
nation are collected and the majority of combatants are disarmed.
2. Demobilization programs are more likely to be successful in their contribution to
deterring conflict if all parties privy to the conflict are bound to the peace accords and
uphold their responsibilities throughout the mandate.
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3. Reintegration programs are more likely to be successful to their contributions to deterring
conflict if the vocational training is of high quality. Along with this, reintegration
programs are more likely to be successful if a majority of disarmed and demobilized
combatants are enrolled and graduate from this vocational training.
4. The overall success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs is likely
if each dimension is adequately funded.
For the purpose of this comparative analysis, I will analyze the disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration programs in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic between 1997 and
2012 to determine the factors that influence DDR programs’ ability to reduce or halt conflict in
peacebuilding states. I hypothesize that an ideal DDR program would include strength in all
three dimensions, as well as adequate coordination and funding for the project.
C. Variables
As the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Rwanda, Burundi,
and the Democratic Republic of Congo are examined throughout this comparative analysis, their
success will be measured based on the presence of conflict in the region at the time that the
program ends. Alongside this initial measurement, I will also examine the factors that contribute
to the ability for DDR systems to reduce conflict in each country. Once this assessment is
achieved, I will examine each dimension of the program individually. For the purpose of this
study, each dimension will be measured by the following…
1.

Disarmament will be measured by the number of combatants that are disarmed,
relative to the overall size of the population. Within the category of disarmament, I
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will examine how the time it takes to implement this specific dimension of the
program contributes to the overall number of people who are disarmed.
2. Demobilization will be measured based on the number of armed parties that are
demobilized in demobilization camps.
3. Reintegration programs will be examined based on the quality of their vocational
education alongside and the number of former militants who attend and graduate from
the program proportional to the number of individuals who are considered disarmed
combatants. Although reintegration is often measured by the amount of former
combatants who gain employment after going through the program, I have chosen to
examine the number of individuals who receive quality vocational training because
the number of individuals who receive employment can vary depending on the state
of economic development throughout the country as a whole.
Through these measurements, I will be able to draw correlations between the factors that are
most important to the success of DRR programs to prevent conflict during the peacebuilding
process.
D. Case Studies
Since 1992, the majority of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs
have been executed on the African continent.63 Due to the continent’s history with conflict, there
is a higher concentration of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs as
countries move towards forging agreements with warring parties and transition into the stages of
peacebuilding. This comparative analysis will specifically analyze the methods that sponsors
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employ to execute DDR programs in three countries that were selected due to their differing
success levels in their ability to reduce conflict. In an attempt to identify which aspects of DDR
programs are most important to the system’s success at reducing the presence of conflict in
Eastern and Central Africa, I will examine the implementation of DDR in Rwanda, Burundi, and
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Each of these programs were implemented within the
fifteen-year period between 1997 and 2012, share a similar geographical location, and have
overlap regarding the context of their conflicts. Many of the macro-factors that experts like Lilli
Banholzer are concerned with are controlled for through the selection of these case studies, as all
three of these nations have relatively low economic development, have a sense of cultural
homogeneity, and have young and developing governments at the time of the implementation of
state sanctioned disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. This study will examine each of
the three countries’ disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in the
chronological order of its implementation: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Each of the three case studies that will be examined throughout this comparative analysis
implemented DDR programs between 1997 and 2012 that varied on their success to halt the
presence of conflict within the confines of their boarders.
In Rwanda, the first disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration campaign began in
1997 and lasted until 2001.64 After the Rwandan Genocide that lasted one hundred days in 1994
and resulted in the deaths of over eight hundred thousand people, civilian control over the
military was instituted and the state began to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former militants
from the Rwandan Defense Force, the Forces Armees Rwandais (also known as the FAR), and
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other smaller militant genocidaires groups.65 Rwanda’s DDR program is regarded as a success
due to the system’s quality in its construction and the number of former militants that were
reintegrated into the country’s economy.66 Alongside Rwanda, Burundi is also regarded among
conflict and peacebuilding specialists as a success.67 Under the Arusha Agreement of 2000,
Burundi was required to implement a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program
that was overseen by their transitional government and executed in 2004.68 From 2004 to 2008,
the state government of Burundi oversaw a DDR system that was outlined within the conflict’s
peace agreement and included a time line and comprehensive technical plans.69 In an attempt to
understand the factors that contribute to the ability for DDR systems to reduce the presence of
conflict, the programs implemented in Rwanda and Burundi will be analyzed in this study to gain
a better understanding as to why they were successful at decreasing the presence and likelihood
of conflict.
Contrastingly, the Democratic Republic of Congo experienced differences in their
implementation of DDR programs that contributed to their failure to deter the presence of
conflict. The Democratic Republic of Congo faced many challenges in its implementation of
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program between 2004 and 2011. Despite the
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state government’s attempt to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former militants into civil
society, the Democratic Republic of Congo experienced a resurgence of violence as the program
was unable to prevent individuals from rejoining militant groups.70 The failures of the DDR
programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo will be examined comparatively to that of
Rwanda and Burundi to further understand what factors contribute to disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration program’s ability to reduce or prevent conflict.
E. Future of the Comparative Analysis
As African nations moved toward independence from their colonial oppressors in the
1960s, freedom and peace was not immediately gratified for much of the continent.71 As
independent governments were formed, the legacy of colonialism lingered throughout the region,
influencing the creation of chaos, civil war, and violence throughout many of the continent’s
individual countries.72 Many people are still suffering from conflicts, like those still living in
destitution and fear in places like Mugunga, as states have failed in their implementation of
peacebuilding mechanisms like disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. However, as the
conflicts in the Central and Eastern regions of the continent subsided, many of these
peacebuilding mechanisms work to prevent the resurgence of violence, stabilize the region, and
further social and economic development.
For the purpose of this comparative analysis, as aforementioned, I will examine
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration as one specific mechanism within peacebuilding
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initiatives. As such, for the remainder of this investigation, I will analyze the factors that
contribute to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs ability to successfully
halting violence in Central and Eastern Africa. This comparative analysis was intended to
contribute to the literature already published regarding that factors that contribute to the success
of DDR, arguing that it is a comprehensive and holistic approach that is vital to DDR’s ability to
reduce conflict. The investigation will conclude with a discussion of the importance of
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs and the effectiveness at reducing or
ending the presence of conflict in Eastern and Central Africa. In the upcoming chapters, I will
examine the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Rwanda, Burundi, and
the Democratic Republic of Congo during the years between 1997 and 2012 to gain a further
understanding of the factors that contribute to the ability for DDR to successfully reduce conflict
and act as a mechanism towards peacebuilding.
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Chapter Two
Rwanda: Light in the Midst of Darkness
On July 4th, 1994, the Rwanda Patriotic Force (RPF) moved into Kigali against the state
military and Hutu militias, marking the beginning of the end of the Rwandan Genocide and Civil
War.73 As the Tutsi-dominated military force advanced through the capital, a mass exodus of
Hutus and former genocidaires fled to refugee camps in Zaire, where their presence would
instigate heinous instability and violence for the Congolese in the years to come.74 When the
violence finally stopped, over eight hundred thousand people were declared dead or missing and
an estimated seventy-seven thousand percent of the Tutsi population had been exterminated.75
Rwanda infrastructure laid in ruin, as hospitals, schools, and government buildings had been
destroyed or ransacked and harvests had been destroyed. Many members of the population
became victims of mass rapes and sex slavery; the carnage resulted in the creation of unmarked
mass graves, or, in some cases, left decomposing bodies out in the open, yet to be laid to rest.76
Generations of Rwandans were completely destroyed and many families were annihilated – their
lineage ending because of violence created by their neighbors, friends, and those whom they
thought could be trusted.77 As the country faced this mass devastation, the strength and
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effectiveness of peacebuilding programs in Rwanda became imperative in the deterrence of
resurging conflict and economic, social, and political development in the failed state.
The peacebuilding process in Rwanda began prior to the genocide. In 1993, the United
Nations sponsored the brokering of the Peace Agreement Between the Government of the
Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which came be to know as the Arusha
Accords. The Rwandan military, known as the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF), and government
were largely controlled by members of the Hutu population, while the Rwandan Patriotic Front,
led by Paul Kagame, was a predominantly Tutsi rebel group prior to the massacres in 1994.78
The negotiations mediated by the United Nations in Arusha, Tanzania, resulted in an agreement
that would end the Rwandan Civil War and establish a government in which both parties were
required to equally share power.79 With representation from Burundi, Uganda, Zaire, Tanzania,
the African Union, the United Nations, Germany, Belgium, the United States, France, Nigeria,
and Zimbabwe, the two parties agreed to implement the Arusha Agreement in thirty seven days
and elect a transitional government to lead the state as conflict-reconstruction and institution
building began.80 Although the agreement was signed in August of 1993, the two participating
parties demonstrated very little interest in enforcing the agreement. Both the Government of the
Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front continued to train their members in armed
combat, violating the agreement’s provision requiring the national military to decrease in overall
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size and the full demobilization of the RPF.81 Although the United Nations was to supervise the
peacebuilding process in Rwanda, tensions between the two parties continued and messages
about an ethnic cleansing of the Tutsi community spread throughout Hutu militias.82 Despite the
initial attempt for peace, the assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana on April 6th, 1994
triggered the beginning of the Rwandan Genocide.83 The failure for the 1993 Arusha Accords to
deter the explosion of violence in Rwanda in 1994 served to caution the international community
and the newly established Rwandan government from the perils of weak peacebuilding
provisions and feeble enforcement. With the assistance of the United Nations Assistance Mission
for Rwanda (UNAMIR), the Republic of Rwanda established a disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration operation for former soldiers of the Rwanda Defense Force (also knowns as the
Rwandan Armed Forces prior to 1994 (FAR)) and the armed genocidaires who still resided in
Rwanda.84 This post-conflict development program focused on national reconciliation and
modernization with an emphasis on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration provisions.85
The post-genocide disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations began in
Rwanda with the establishment of two programs, with different provisions and oversight. The
first program, established and supported by Rwandan Presidential Decree Number 37/01 under
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President Pasteur Bizimungu, established the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration
Commission.86 This institution was mandated to support the reinsertion and reintegration of
former combatants and military soldiers into the civil sector and formal economy with the
intention that their transition would deter resurgence, instability, and spark comprehensive
economic development in the wake of tragedy.87 Overseen by the Rwandan government and
President Bizimungu’s cabinet, the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission was
established in 1997 and included six main responsibilities according to the Republic of Rwanda’s
Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Program (RDRC) Charter:
1. To oversee the social reinsertion and reintegration of members of the Rwandan
Defense Forces.
2. To receive, demobilize, and carry out social reinsertion and reintegration for
former members of the national army before July 19, 1994, or a former
member of any other armed group that was repatriated.
3. To advocate for the initiatives meant for former military members with
disability and follow up the implementation of such initiatives.
4. To advise the government on the policy of demobilization, social reinsertion
and reintegration of former military members.
5. To coordinate the actions of all Government organs and all stakeholders
working with the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission on
matters related to demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of former
military members.
6. To carry out such other activities as may be required for the achievement of its
mission.88
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The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission focused specifically on
demobilizing and reintegrating former militants, rather than disarming them altogether.
Disarmament was voluntary for individuals interested in participating in the program, the
Rwandan government lacked resources to establish a robust arms collection program. Along with
this, by 1997 the United Nations and the World Bank invested their monetary and technical
support for the disarmament of former genocidaires and members of the Interahamwe in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, where Hutus established refugee communities after their exodus
from Rwanda in July of 1994.89
Without the intention to forcefully disarm individuals participating in operations run by
the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, the Rwandan government aimed to
demobilize and reintegrate five major insurgency groups into civil society: “the Rwandan
Patriotic Front; the Hutu-led government’s Armed Forces of Rwanda; the Rwanda Patriotic
Army, later renamed the Rwandan Defense Forces; the abacagenzi, a Hutu insurgency in
northwest Rwanda; and the armed groups of Rwandan Hutu rebels that fled to the Democratic
Republic of Congo from the Interahamwe.”90 The first of these groups to participate in
demobilization and reintegration was the Rwandan Patriot Front and the Rwandan Defense
Force. From the program’s implementation in September of 1997 to March of 2001, Rwanda
reinserted RPA soldiers into the RDF, to nearly balance the national military of Rwanda between
the two organization and create relatively equal populations of Hutus and Tutsis within the
state’s armed forces as the original 1993 Arusha Accords required.91 Thus, from 1997 to 2001,
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the Rwandan government created a equal balance of Hutus to Tutsis in officer positions of the
RDF, and created a sixty-forty ethnic balance within other ranks proportional to the population.92
However, the success of this reinsertion program is reported by the government of Rwanda, as
the ethnic identity of soldiers was not revealed to the rest of the military to dissuade tension
between the two groups. As a result, these proportions could potentially be inaccurately reported.
After reinsertion, the remaining sixty-eight percent of the Rwandan Patriotic Front participated
in formal demobilization, which required medical counseling, social sensitization, and the
allowance of a transitional safety net equaling the amount of nine hundred United States
dollars.93 From 1997 to 2001, members of the RPF were held in demobilization centers for two
weeks and then received vocational training prior to their release into civil society.94
After the demobilization and reintegration of members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front,
members of the Rwandan Defense Force and ex-FAR soldiers began participating in the stateoperated demobilization and reintegration program from December of 2001 to May of 2007.95
During demobilization, those who had once been included in insurgencies across Rwanda were
transitioned through mobilization camps that provided individuals with medical attention,
shelter, nutrition, civic education, as well as basic vocational skills.96 Along with this,
demobilization training camps included reeducation programs that attempted to fight genocidal
ideology called ingando. Nationalistic in nature, these programs taught former combatants and
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participants in the RDF and ex-FAR about Rwandan history, national identity, judicial
reconciliation, and the gacaca process.97 Former militants also received information on microfinancing, public health measures, and received information on active cooperatives in different
industries for those reintegrating into the national economy.98 Going further than the needs of the
former combatants, the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission provided
condensed demobilization programs for the families of participating combatants to ease their
transition into civil society.
The reintegration process, similar to the demobilization process of the RDRC, included
many different forms of vocational training activities and encouraged participants to join public
works programs that sought to rebuild the nation in the wake of tragedy.99 Reintegration included
monetary benefits for militants who agreed to transition into civilian life. After demobilization,
former militants received service allowances, reintegration grants, and vulnerability support
grants as long as they maintained a peaceful demeanor and contributed to the long-term
restoration and development of communities across the state.100 Under the Rwandan
Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, former combatants were provided access microloans and education programs in industries like agriculture, construction, taxi driving, and
tailoring.101 The reintegration process that took place under the control of the Rwandan

97

Waldorf, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda,” 11.

98

“New Beginnings for Ex-Combatants in Rwanda,” The World Bank.

Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terance McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and
Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo,”
African Security 2:1 (2009).
99

Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the
Great Lakes.”
100

101

“New Beginnings for Ex-Combatants in Rwanda,” The World Bank.

31

Grace Marshall
Honors Thesis

government coexisted alongside a judicial reconciliation program, in which former combatant
were potentially subjected to criminal investigations into their actions during the genocide.102
Transitional justice occurred alongside the reintegration process, furthering the sense of security
among Rwandans that the period of conflict and strife throughout the nation was over.
Although the state controlled the demobilization and reintegration process in Rwanda
through the establishment of the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, from
2002 to 2008 the institution received added support and funding from the World Bank through
the International Development Association’s Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration
Program.103 Other members of the international community, specifically the United States Aid
for International Development and the United Nations Development Program, provided
assistance to the state-operated demobilization and reintegration program.104 Despite the
international community’s involvement, the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration
Commission implemented and oversaw the execution of the entire program, demonstrating a
state led approach for individuals residing in Rwanda after the genocide. Despite the Rwanda
Demobilization and Reintegration Program’s initial goal of reintegrating 45,000 former militants,
by the end of the operation in 2007, the Rwandan government effectively demobilized and
reintegrated 57,538 former militants. 105 Of these individuals, thirty-two percent were reinserted
into the military from the Rwandan Patriotic Front.106

102

“New Beginnings for Ex-Combatants in Rwanda,” The World Bank.

“Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Project,” The World Bank, accessed April 14, 2020.
https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P075129?lang=en.
103

104

Alusala, “Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s Concern.”

105

Alusala, “Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s Concern.”

106

Alusala, “Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s Concern.”

32

Grace Marshall
Honors Thesis

Although the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission was
considered successful in its ability to curb violence within the state through its treatment of
former militants, the largest threat to stability for the nation resided right across its boarders in
the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The former genocidaires, members of
Hutu militant groups, and the Interahamwe fled into the Democratic Republic of Congo after the
end of the civil war, placing the responsibility on the United Nations to disarm, demobilize, and
reintegrate the various populations back into Rwandan society.107 In 2000, the United Nations
established the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (MONUSCO), which gained the responsibility of DDR operations of the Rwandan Hutus
living in the Democratic Republic of Congo after the outbreak of the Second Congo War, which
included conflicts among the Congolese and the former-Rwandan Hutus in the Kivu
Provinces.108 The Republic of Rwanda’s interest in the prosecution and disarmament of former
Hutu genocidaires and the Interahamwe, along with the Rwandan Defense Force’s military
involvement in the Second Congolese War, resulted in criticism from multilateral organizations
like the United Nations.109 Due to their involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
Rwandan government subsequently lost funding for their Demobilization and Reintegration
Commission, requiring them to look at the population of former militants residing within their
borders, rather than the external security threat created from the inability to disarm and
demobilize the displaced and refugee Hutu populations. This external threat would prove to be
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important however, as the Second Congo War spilled across the Rwandan border into the
Northern regions in 1996 but were defeated by the Rwandan Defense Force in 2001.110
Internal disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration within Rwandan also occurred
on behalf of the United Nations and World Bank through the Multi-Country Program for
Demobilization and Reintegration. The program served as a joint operation between the World
Bank’s International Development Association and the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping and was implemented in the Great Lakes region of Eastern Africa which included
Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.111 The Multi-Country Demobilization
and Reintegration Program “sought to operationalize DDR strategy, and as such consisted of a
set of guiding principals in support of national programs, special projects, and regional activities,
provides criteria for country participation, and outlines a process for developing, financing,
implementing, and monitoring disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration activities in the
region.”112 Operations in Rwanda began in 2002 and aimed to supporting economic
reintegration programs throughout the state and facilitate the reallocation of funds from the
Rwandan government to different defense, social, and economic sector expenditures.113 The
overall cost of the program was 53. 31 million American dollars, in which most of the funding
was allocated toward health and social protection programs.114 The Multi-Country
Demobilization and Reintegration Program provided monetary support for the RDRC to disarm,
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demobilize, and reintegrate combatants into civil society and the economy, contributing to the
overall effectiveness of the operation and its ability to deter the resurgence of conflict in the
region.
The establishment of these two-coinciding disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration programs resulted in tremendous strides toward stability and peace from 1997 to
2008 in Rwanda, when the mandate of both program came to an end. According to reports
released by the World Bank’s Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project in 2012, the
program managed to meet the following measurements of success:
1. “53.3% of former militants were reported to be socially accepted by their
communities.
2. 67.1% of former militants were economically reintegrated.
3. 100% of former militants had their demand for demobilization services met.
4. 10,029 members of armed groups had been demobilized (2,938 by this project).
5. 26,585 RDF members had been demobilized.
6. 86 percent of ex-combatants had an ID card and medical insurance six months
after demobilization.
7. 100 percent of severely disabled ex-combatants received their due benefits within
nine months of demobilization.
8. 100 percent of ex-combatants have settled down in their community of choice
with access to shelter and food security.
9. 7,932 resettlement kits were delivered to dependents of ex-armed group members.
10. 91 percent of demobilized individuals were satisfied with the services and
information provided in the demobilization centers.”115

“Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration in Rwanda,” The World Bank, accessed on February 12, 2020.
https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/02/01/emergency-demobilization-and-reintegration-in-rwanda.
115

35

Grace Marshall
Honors Thesis

The impact of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Rwanda, specifically
those implemented and overseen by the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration
Commission, created overall state stability and curbed violence within the country. Through the
World Bank’s own research, over ninety-eight percent of individuals who transitioned through
their program rated it as effective and satisfactory in its ability to provide helpful information,
strong vocational training, and ample employment opportunities during reintegration.116
To further understand the impact of peacebuilding mechanisms in Rwanda after 1994,
specifically efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants into civil society, it
is helpful to recognize the changes to the overall stability of the nation and presence of violence
among various communities between 1997 and 2008. One mechanism used to understand these
changes is the Fragile State Index, which is funded by the Fund for Peace to measure political
risk, stability, and the likelihood for conflict to arise.117 Although the program only began
evaluating countries in 2005, the Fragile State Index demonstrates that from 2005 to 2007,
Rwanda moved eighteen positions within the global ranking of the stability of countries – going
from the twenty-fourth most fragile state in the world in 2005 to the forty-second ranked state in
2007.118 Although this ranking is influenced by the changes of other countries, and one state
might move ahead of another due to escalation of conflict rather than improvements to
governance and security in the other, the index demonstrates impressive growth for a state like
Rwanda. The index also notes that from 2005 to 2007, Rwanda saw a consistent decrease to
external and internal security threats, a steady decrease in ethnic and political divisions among
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individuals within the state, and an overall decrease to human rights violations within the state.119
Along with this, since the Fragile State Index began, the Fund for Peace has reported that
Rwanda has experienced significant economy growth, contributing to growing economic
equality within the state from its former position during the Civil War and providing a budding
economy for the reintegration of former militants and offering inexplicit economic incentive for
the continuation of peace.120
Promising reports regarding the state of violence in Rwanda after the implementation of
demobilization and reintegration programs are also revealed in the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program produced by the Center of the Study of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute Oslo.
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) provides researchers information regarding the
presence of state base violence, non-state violence, and one-sided violence throughout every
country in the world. 121 In Rwanda, the UCDP indicates that in 1997 when demobilization and
reintegration began in Rwanda, the total number of deaths from internal conflict and violence
was 4,698, and during the year of 2006 there were zero casualties reported from violence within
the state.122 This demonstrates the ability of the Rwandan government to curb the presence of
violence within the state, and highlights the success of their demobilization and reintegration
program at deterring the resurgence of further conflict. It is important to address that despite the
promising data the UCDP produced regarding Rwanda, much of the violence within the state in
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the later 1990s, like the 4,698 individual deaths in 1997, are attributed to the outbreak of conflict
in the Democratic Republic of Congo.123 When the Hutu genocidaires, some members of the exFAR, the Interahamwe, and the ousted Hutu government fled Rwanda in 1994, they found refuge
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) under the protection of President Mobutu
Sese Seko.124 While in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ousted government of Rwanda
founded the Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda (RDR) in 1995, whom
established a military-like group consisting of former genocidaires and Interahamwe called the
Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR).125 Violence within Rwanda during the
later 1990s can be attributed to the acts of the PALIR, whose members continued to fight the
Rwandan government internally. In “Chapter Four: Neglect in the Democratic Republic of
Congo,” the conflict within the DRC during the turn of the twenty-first century will be further
investigated – linking disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts to the continuation
of violence. In Rwanda, the presence of the PALIR was in part attended to through military
force, however, individuals interested in demobilization and reintegration benefits were deemed
eligible so long as they sought peace. In this regard, although the violence reported in 1997 by
the UCDP was more frequently due to an external state-to-state conflict between the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Rwanda, internal violence with the republic did wean out to nonexistence
by 2007.126
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Rwanda serves as an informative case-study to the understanding of strong DDR
programs. The hypothesis proposed in Chapter One of this investigation are relevant to the study
of the republic, even if the state’s peacebuilding operation does not align with the predicted
results. The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program reported that the local nature of
the program contributed to its overall success. In the present-day, the Rwanda Demobilization
and Reintegration Program is used as model for other post-conflict development programs. The
success of Rwanda’s state-operated program is often attributed to its emphasis on ingando during
demobilization, demonstrating the importance of strong education programs.127 In Rwanda,
strong demobilization and reintegration programs that include intensive reeducation curriculums,
strong vocational training modules, and temporary financial support on behalf of the
government, demonstrated to be more important to the deterrence of violence than a
disarmament program. Rwanda’s inability to establish state-operated disarmament programs was
attributed to a lack of funding for a robust and comprehensive operation that prevented the illicit
sale of weapons after collection.128 Along with this, ethnic tension between the Hutu and Tutsi
continued to exist after the genocide; Hutus participating in demobilization and reintegration
programs were initially against the process if it included disarmament, due to fears that the Tutsicontrolled Rwandan government would not uphold the 1993 Arusha Agreement and retaliate
against the Hutu population as seen in Burundi in 1972.129 Due to the state’s inability to establish
a disarmament program due to its historical and cultural contexts, more funding and attention
was placed on the demobilization curriculum and success of reintegration. Thus, for the purpose

Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the
Great Lakes.”
127

128

Alusala, “Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s Concern.”

129

Alusala, “Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s Concern.”

39

Grace Marshall
Honors Thesis

of this investigation, the timing of the disarmament program in a state did not demonstrate to
influence the success of the DDR program in Rwanda, as a formal disarmament program did not
exist.
A holistic approach to demobilization and reintegration demonstrated to be successful in
Rwanda, as the program included robust demobilization and reintegration operations that
successfully reintegrated 57,538 former militants from the Rwandan Civil War and Genocide.
Along with this, the program’s ample allowance of funding from both the state and the
international community contributed to its longevity and complexity, demonstrating flexibility
for the various needs of the population. The failure of the international community to defend
Rwanda from catastrophe in 1994 created a culture of guilt among members of the United
Nations, thus, guaranteeing funding for the internal demobilization and reintegration of former
combatants in Rwanda so long as the state remained absent from the Congolese affairs.130 The
Rwandan case study also reveals that the compliance of all participating parties in the conflict in
the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program is imperative to its success at
deterring violence. In the case of Rwanda, the RPF, the RDF, and the ex-FAR’s participation in
demobilization camps resulted in a large population of former combatants that were committed
to peace. The exodus of former genocidaires, Hutu militant groups, and the Interahamwe into the
Democratic Republic of Congo resulted in the escalation of conflict in the DRC, rather than the
inability for the Republic of Rwanda to stabilize after their perpetration of the genocide.
As a result of these factors, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Rwanda
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serves as a successful example of how robust DDR programs can contribute to the deterrence of
violence. Although Rwanda lacks a formal disarmament program in congruence with
demobilization and reintegration, the operation to transition former militants into civilian life
does provide insight on the importance of timing, party participation, and funding for the success
of DDR. Along with this, the lack of violence within Rwanda after the end of demobilization and
reintegration and consistent economic growth within the state highlights the successful nature of
the program and the positive conditions contributing to the reduction of incentives for conflict to
redevelop. The initial goals of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program, as
evaluated by the World Bank International Development Association, was to demobilize
approximately 45,000 former militants from the various armed groups in Rwanda and
reintegrated them into civilian life.131 In the International Center for Transitional Justice’s report
on the data provided by the United Nations, World Bank, and the Rwanda Demobilization and
Reintegration Program regarding the DDR operations from 1997 to 2007, an estimated 57,538
former militants within the state were demobilized and reintegrated – receiving support from
both the international community and state government.132 Overall, the Rwandan government
reintegrated more individuals than anticipated, demonstrating overwhelming success in the
program’s effectiveness and ability to curb violence throughout the state.
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Chapter Three
Not Good Enough: DDR in Burundi
Just south of Rwanda, the Republic of Burundi faced similar struggles as the Tutsi and
Hutu rivalry resulted in tragic conflict. Like Rwanda, Burundi shares a large population of ethnic
Hutus and Tutsis, with a Hutu majority but a long history of Tutsi rule due to Belgian
colonialism. Under the Belgian colonial rule, oppressive provisions divided the two ethnic
groups, creating a toxic power dynamic that led to heinous violence as the country sought
independence and the two populations competed for rule. When Burundi declared independence
in 1962, attempted coups spearheaded by the Hutu population began against the Tutsi-run
government, until 1972 when a large Hutu rebellion resulted in the death of thousands of Tutsis.
The Tutsi led government and military began an ethnic cleansing campaign after the attempted
Hutu rebellion, aimed at wiping out a potential class of Hutu leaders to ensure continued Tutsi
control.133 At the hands of the government, and estimated two-hundred and fifty thousand Hutu
Burundians were killed.134 This massive loss of life within the nation set the precedent for the
way political change would play out in the nation for nearly two decades, until 1993 when the
state carried out elections that resulted in a democratically elected Hutu president and legislative
majority.135 For the international community, a step toward democratization within Burundi
seemed as a positive indicator that the country’s history of violent politics was behind them,
along with the end of the civil war. However, four months after Burundi elected the Hutu
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President, Melchior Ndadaye, a Tutsi insurrection assassignated the executive and attempted a
military coup – resulting in the resurgence of a civil war that many believed to be behind
them.136 After his assassination, Hutus retaliated against the Tutsi population, killing over
twenty-five thousand members of the ethnic group and those who were sympathizers. The death
of President Ndadaye resulted in a full scale war between the Tutsi dominated military and Hutu
rebel groups, and only escalated further when the president of the Hutu dominated political party,
Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), was assassinated alongside President
Habyarimana, the Hutu president of Rwanda, in 1994.137 The conflict between participating
Burundian Hutus and Tutsis resulted in the deaths of over two-hundred thousand citizens from
1993 to 1998, and created a displaced population of over six-hundred thousand Burundians
whom migrated to states such as Tanzania, Zaire, (present day Democratic Republic of Congo),
Rwanda, and Uganda.138
Although the violence created from the Burundian Civil War sporadically lasted until
2006, efforts to curb the conflict within the nation began as early as 1996 when President Pierre
Buyoya, who previously controlled the Republic of Burundi prior to the elections of 1993, seized
power over the state in a Tutsi led coup d’état.139 The Tutsi president began negotiations with the
Hutu led legislature, where the FRODEBU remained in power despite the country’s internal
strife. These discussions were later mediated by the former president of Tanzania, Julius
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Nyerere, in 1998, and after his death were then overseen by President Nelson Mandela of South
Africa in 1999.140 In an effort to establish a peace agreement in Burundi, nineteen different
political parties and representatives within the conflict were included in the creation of the
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of Burundi, which came to be colloquially known
as the 2000 Arusha Agreement/Accords.141 All of the participating parties, and specifically the
Hutu majority National Assembly and the Tutsi run Government of Burundi (led by President
Buyoya) agreed on five specific protocols within the agreement…
1. Nature of the conflict.
2. Democracy and Good Governance: Constitution and Transitional
Arrangements.
3. Questions of Peace and Security: Defense and Security Force Reforms and a
Permanent Ceasefire.
4. Reconstruction and Development: Economic Matters.
5. Guarantees on Implementation of the Agreement.142
According to the University of Massachusetts Political Economy Research Institute’s Conflict
Profile of the Burundi Civil War, the Arusha Agreement of 2000 established a “multi-party
government and a multi-ethnic Burundian military with forces drawn from both rebelling groups
and the state’s original armed forces.”143 The agreement was signed in 2000, establishing a
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transitional government; however, the provisions within the accords were not implemented fully
until 2003, when the ceasefire officially began.144
The Arusha Agreement of 2000 was meant to diminish violence within the state and set
the country on a path toward true democratization. In an effort to secure the state, the Arusha
Agreement required the implementation of five specific sub-provisions within the third section of
the agreement…
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

All participating parties were required to ceasefire within seventy-two hours of
the agreement’s signing.
The agreement must be implemented immediately.
The ceasefire would be overseen by the Joint Liaison Teams, which was
comprised of representatives from all nineteen parties, the United Nations, and
the African Union.
The Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC), which presided over the deployed
United Nations Peacekeeping Force, the reform within the Burundi Armed
Forces to include all participating ethnic groups, and the implementation of a
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations, would include
members of the nineteen participating parties, the United Nations, and the
African Union. These operations would begin immediately upon the
implementation of the ceasefire agreement.
Members of armed political parties, movements, militias, and rebel groups
would disarm prior to their participation in assembly and demobilization
facilities.145

Thus, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations within Burundi began with the
implementation of the 2000 Arusha Accords in 2003, and came to an end on January 1st, 2007,
when the African Union and the United Nations suspended their formal assistance to former
assailants within the state. Between 2003 and 2004, participants of the conflict were permitted to
voluntarily disarm and enlist in the military in an effort to create an ethnic balance of Hutus and
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Tutsis in the state’s armed forces (Burundian National Defense Force). Thus, the formal
transition of former militants to civil society began in 2004 after the state created a heterogenous
military with fifty-fifty percent ethnic representation.146 This provision, established within the
2000 Arusha Accords, required that one ethnic group could not be larger than fifty percent of the
military’s population for a period of time determined by the Senate.147 Currently, the Burundian
National Defense Force still contains a heterogenous balance between the two ethnic groups,
demonstrating as stabilizing mechanism within the nation and serving to destroy ethnic tension
between the Hutus and Tutsis.148
Each phase of the DDR operation in Burundi was overseen by a different governing
body, however, the Burundian government played a critical role in the final implementation of
the program. The state controlled approach received funding and added assistance from three
organizations: The United Nations and the African Union as per the Arusha Accords, and the
World Bank through their pre-existing Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration
Program which played a vital role in DDR throughout the Great Lakes Region (and will later be
discussed further in Chapter Four: The Democratic Republic of Congo).149 The disarmament and
registration phase of DDR in Burundi began under the oversight of the United Nations
Operations in Burundi (ONUB) and the JCC, whom were both supervised by the Burundian
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government.150 After former combatants were disarmed, the Burundian National Commission of
Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NCDRR) registered participants for
demobilization, transporting individuals to facilities located in the seventeen different provinces
throughout the state.151 The demobilization of former militants in Burundi was then finally
implemented by the National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration,
with the participation of the World Bank’s Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration
Program, the United Nations’ Operation in Burundi, and the African Union’s Mission in
Burundi.152 During this process, militants received reinsertion packages which included an
eighteenth month salary equivalent to the pay they would receive at their decided military rank,
and one of five options for reintegration:
1. “To return to their former employer prior to the Civil War with subsidized
employment and referral;”
2. “Return to a formal education in a Burundian school;”
3. “Receive vocational training for self-employment;”
4. “Receive Entrepreneurial Support;”
5. “(or) Receive Income Generated Activities Support, which included receiving
the goods of their choice (food commodities, animals, or equipment) and
information on how to set up a project with these tools whilst still residing at
the demobilization center.” 153
This process resulted in the reunification of families across the country, the reintegration of
Burundian militants into the national economy, and included separate requirements for
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vulnerable members of the population like women, children, and the disabled, who required
additional support from the government and participating international organizations.
During the formal period of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the
Republic of Burundi, participating parties contributed to efforts to stabilize the region and
support non-state actor in their transition out of conflict and into civil society. The program’s
initial intention was to disarm and demobilize fifty-five thousand former militants; disarm twenty
thousand members of the government militia (individuals not in the formal military, but claiming
to support the Hutu government through militant violence and non-state organization); and
dismantle the rebelling chain of command network.154 According to Andy Knight, an expert in
multilateral security, global governance, and the editor of African Security, the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration campaign in Burundi resulted in the demobilization of 21,379
former militants, the implementation of “security sector reform,” and a “comprehensive social
reintegration package” by the end of the year in 2006.155 The United Nations reports on the
program also indicated that 28,378 militias were demobilized under the DDR operations from
2003 to 2007, which included 18,709 members of the military police and 9,670 militant
combatants.156 Regarding disarmament, by the end of 2006 over five thousand and six hundred
weapons were recovered during the DDR operation to the United Nations Operations in
Burundi.157 These weapons ranged from grenade launchers, RPG 7s, small arms, AK 47s, and
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light machine guns; under the supervision of the United Nations Operations in Burundi, these
arms were then stored and destroyed.158 Although the Joint Operations Plan between the
Burundian government, the United Nations, and the World Bank did successfully reintegrate
former combatants, the program’s initial goal aimed at transitioning fifty-five thousand former
militants through disarmament and demobilization.159 Of the target population of fifty-five
thousand, the program within Burundi only demobilized 19,739 former militants, which accounts
for a little more than a third of the operations goal, or thirty-five percent. Thus, although the
program did demonstrate success in its ability to support the individuals that underwent DDR, it
was unable to assist the other two-thirds of the target population and complete its goal.
The state experienced challenges curbing violence and protecting Burundian civilians
from continued conflict after the implementation of the 2000 Arusha Accords. When the accords
were implemented in 2003, one group, the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), were outside
of the agreement throughout the majority of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
process.160 The FNL represented a Hutu militia group with an estimated population of three
thousand, and operated as a guerrilla movement within the country during the peace process.161
Although the FNL finally came to an agreement with the Burundian government in 2006 through
the establishment of the Dar es Salaam Agreement, failure to implement the provisions
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immediately through a joint task force hindered the opportunity for peace in the region.162
Although intending to move toward peace through the Dar es Salaam Agreement, defections
from the FNL continued to operate in rural communities throughout the state, like Ruyaga, Isale,
and Mubimbi.163 Along with this, distrust among participating parties of the 2000 Arusha
Agreement hindered the success of disarmament in the nation. Due to the continuation of lowlevel conflict, many former militants refused to participate in disarmament despite their interest
in demobilizing.164 The desire to protect themselves combined with a history of violence in
politics created a culture of fear throughout Burundian communities, regardless of their identity
as a Hutu or Tutsi.165 The presence of these arms created instability in the region, however,
violence in Burundi was likely only going to cease as Burundians were disarmed. The inability
for the Burundian government to curb violence in the region for parties like the FNL, contributed
to the capability of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations in the nation to
be successful as decreasing armed conflict in the region.
Through the analysis of the specific provisions of the disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration operations in Burundi after the implementation of the 2000 Arusha Agreement, it is
obvious that another hinderance to the program’s success was its inability to be efficiently
implemented in a timely manner. In 2003 when the ceasefire of the 2003 Arusha Agreement was
implemented, conflict within the state had not fully subsided and violence continued until former
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militants were assembled into their demobilization camps.166 Equipped to be implemented
immediately after the ceasefire, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program lost
credibility among former militants who already experienced a distrust for other participating
parties in the agreement. As mentioned early, this distrust contributed to the refusal to disarm
among various parties of former militants seeking the benefits associated with demobilizing.
The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program in Burundi was also limited
by the operation’s inability to continue an adequate cash flow to satisfy the budget of the
program.167 The international community, whom was largely funding the operation, often
delayed their payments to the Burundian government.168 Due to this delay, former combatants
often experienced infrequent payments of their benefits package associated with their
compliance in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process.169 Along with this,
delays from the United Nations often influenced the ability for the African Union to implement
their assistance in the DDR process, as they relied on the funding of the UN. As a result, the
program experienced interruptions in its ability to assist former militants through their
transitions.170 The flexibility of financing the campaign in Burundi revealed to be crucial for the
program’s ability to successfully reintegrate former militants into the civilian sector. Although
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration was overseen by the state, the international
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actors like the United Nations and the World Bank largely funded the program and thus their
ability to flexibly distribute money proved to the key, as often the tasks forces implementing the
program adapted to different circumstanced over the period between 2003 and 2007.171 The
inability for the funding of these operations to be flexible, combined with the finite nature of
funding for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Republic of Burundi, resulted
in the ending of the program. Although many Burundians had undergone reintegration through
the operation, the ending of the program in 2007 was too early, as DDR only accounted for the
reintegration of one-third of the target population of former militants within the country. Twothirds of the target population within Burundi still required demobilization assistance and
economic incentives to cease their pursuance of political or economic gain through violent
means. An increase in funding within the state would have likely helped achieve their initial
goal.
The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process in Burundi required the
involvement of multiple different actors and a strong relationship between the national
government and the international community. In Burundi, the Multi-Country Demobilization and
Reintegration Program financed by the World Bank worked alongside the Burundian National
Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration, which oversaw the coordinated
efforts of the United Nations and the African Union to halt violence and decrease the likelihood
of resurgence in the state. Although the joint DDR programs within Burundi only successfully
reintegrated one-third of the target population of former militants in the state, the operation was
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successful in the ability for the government to support those individuals as a result of the strength
of the state control over the process, the commitment of the participating parties to the provisions
set by the 2000 Arusha Agreement (with one exception), and the strength of the demobilization
and the reintegration packages to provide incentive for former militants to integrate into the
formal economy and civil society. According to the Fragile State Index, Burundi demonstrated
positive improvements decreasing violence and increasing stability within the state. In 2005,
Burundi was ranked fifteenth among one hundred and seventy eight countries for fragility, and in
2007 the state moved down in rank to twenty-four, indicating positive improvements.172 Initially
receiving a Fragile State Index of 96.7 in 2005, Burundi improved in 2007 to a score of 94.1.173
In comparison to the Fragile State Index, the Peace Research Institute - Oslo’s Data on Armed
Conflict indicates similar trends regarding the decrease in violence and armed conflict during the
period of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Burundi. The Data on Armed
Conflict suggests that from 2003 to 2006, a significant decrease in casualties occurred as each
year passed.174 In 2003, Burundi experienced a total of 1,245 recorded deaths from state based
violence, non-state actors, and one sided violence; between the beginning of 2006 to the
beginning of 2007, when the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration campaign
transitioned out of Burundi, only 185 people were reported dead due to violence within the state
related to armed conflict.175 Both the Fragile State Index and the Data on Armed Conflict by the
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Peace Research Institute - Oslo demonstrate that the peacebuilding efforts of the Burundian
National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration, the United Nations
Operations to Burundi, the African Union, and the Multi-Country Demobilization and
Reintegration Program resulted in positive developments to the state of violence within
Burundi’s boarders.
Similar to Rwanda, robust demobilization and reintegration programs in Burundi
demonstrated to be effective in reducing the presence of violence in the state. However,
comparatively, Burundi’s implementation of disarmament provided the state with positive
developments that Rwanda did not seem to require. For the purpose of this investigation, the
success of DDR in Burundi would not be attributed to the implementation of the operation within
a year of the peace accords, as the Arusha Agreement was signed in 2000, the ceasefire began in
2003, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former militants into civil
society did not begin until 2004. Although swift implementation of the ceasefire and formal
DDR process would have likely benefitted Burundi, a ceasefire agreement among participating
parties was unlikely to occur prior to 2003 due to the need for the establishment of peacebuilding
institutions and a transitional government. The second hypothesis in this analysis of successful
characteristics of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs is sustainable for
Burundi with one exception. In the Republic of Burundi, the participation of the nineteen warring
parties in the creation and implementation of the Arusha Agreement was crucial to the success of
DDR in the region. Without their participation, former militants were unlikely to willingly
demobilize and seek economic reintegration, as the incentives to continue the conflict would
have outweighed the reward of disarmament. The FNL’s exclusion from the peace agreement
contributed to the state’s inability to fully curb violence from the Civil War, thus contributing
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further to distrust among civilians and former militants in the DDR program’s ability to build
peace. Had the FNL participated in the Arusha Agreement and sought economic gain and
political participation consequently to disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating, the state
would have experienced further stability.
The hypotheses proposed in Chapter One of this investigation also included a provision
regarding the success of DDR programs in Eastern Africa with strong reintegration packages that
included vocational training. In Burundi, reinsertion packages provided former militants
monetary support alongside five different options for reintegration, which varied to meet the
needs of different demographics of Burundians. This process included strong vocational training
and often guaranteed former militants and their families a pathway to receive further income
alongside reinsertion packages. In Burundi, strong reintegration programs with quality vocational
training incentivized former militants to remain disarmed and demobilized and participate in the
formal economy. Lastly, the fourth hypothesis for this analysis identifies that proper funding for
each dimension of DDR correlates to the success of the program in its efforts to build peace and
curb violence. In Burundi, the Burundian National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion,
and Reintegration, experienced fluctuations in the funding for the program from the international
community, however, each dimension of DDR was proportionally funded to support former
militants through their transition into the civil sector. As a result, Burundi serves as a strong
example for other countries implementing DDR as their state-controlled approach to allocating
funds showed to be successful at reducing violence in the nation.
Burundi serves as a moderately successful case study for disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration in Eastern Africa despite its shortcomings in various areas, like timing,
funding, and party participation. Although the FNL continued its campaign against the state after
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the 2003 ceasefire, the Dar es Salaam Agreement included provisions to allow for members of
the FNL to integrate into the Burundian Armed Forces – thus participating in the security of the
state.176 After the end of the DRR operations in Burundi, the FNL was considered a decreasing
threat. In 2008, the FNL was categorized as a small guerilla force, “motivated by alleviating
poverty and acquiring income” rather than political means.177 In December of 2008, the national
government signed a peace agreement with the FNL formally ending conflict in the region.178
Although the FNL was not included in the Burundian National Commission of Demobilization,
Reinsertion, and Reintegration, without a strong DDR program the government likely would
never have been able to reach an agreement with the militant group. Thus, Burundi serves as a
moderately successful example of the ability for a strong disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration campaign to result in the reduction of violence in a nation, despite only achieving
the transition of one-third of its target population.
The relative success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as the
decreasing presence of violence within the Republic of Burundi, was short lived. The Arusha
Accord’s provisions requiring an ethnically balanced, power sharing government and military
encouraged reconciliation among the Hutus and the Tutsis.179 Although ethnic violence
dwindled, an outbreak of state-sanctioned violence, roll backs on political rights and civil
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liberties, and democratic backsliding became an increasing concern for the international
community in April of 2015, when the President of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, announced an
unconstitutional campaign for a third term in office.180 Although the Arusha Accords included
requirements on the number of terms for president’s to serve in Burundi, the document failed as
a safeguard against constitutional abuse. Prior to this crisis in the young democracy, Burundi
demonstrated traits of democratic erosion and authoritarian rule, however, this largely went
unnoticed from 2007 to 2015 due to the success of post-conflict peacebuilding within the state
and the lack of interethnic conflict. In June of 2015, a faction within the Burundian National
Defense Force attempted a coup d’état against President Nkurunziza, escalating the situation
further despite their failure.181 In July of 2015, President Nkurunziza was reelected and currently
serves as the state’s executive today. After the election of his third term, opposition across the
nation broke out and was met with repressive violence on behalf of the state. Since 2015, the
Human Rights Watch has reported that crimes against humanity have occurred throughout the
country, the government has terminated the operations of over one hundred and thirty non-forprofits, high profile assassination have occurred, and rebel group violence against the
government has resurged.182 Violence within Burundi has hindered economic growth and civilian
security within the state, and many of the effects of the growing humanitarian crisis are the result
of growing authoritarianism and government mismanagement.
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The current state in Burundi relates to the effectiveness of their national disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration program. Although the peace building mechanism cannot take
all of the blame, the inability for the operation to transition a larger portion of former militants in
civil society resulted in instability within various communities. Like most peacebuilding
programs, the efforts that the United Nations, the World Bank, the African Union, and the
National Government of Burundi employed within the state conveniently excluded the
repatriation of Burundian refugees from border states like Tanzania from the initial process.183
The unsolved challenges created out of the Burundian Civil War and the inability for
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration to adequately curb violence within the state
influenced the process of democratic erosion that Burundi has experienced in the last decade.
Along with this, instability within the Democratic Republic of Congo due to the mass exodus of
Hutu militants and genocidaires from both Burundi and Rwanda have contributed to the
resurgence of conflict within Burundi, as militant groups have crossed into the state in acts of
aggression. The failure of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, in part on behalf of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration
Program, has resulted in international consequences on the safety of East Africans residing in the
Great Lakes Region. This failure will be further explained in the following chapter, in an effort
to understand what factors contribute to the overall success of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration programs at curbing violence in Eastern Africa. The current political instability and
humanitarian crisis in Burundi, combined with the overall inability for the Burundian National
Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration, the World Bank’s MultiCountry Demobilization and Reintegration Program, the United Nations’ Operation in Burundi,
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and the African Union’s Mission in Burundi to transition two-thirds of their target population,
demonstrates that DDR in Burundi was moderately effective in curbing violence, but cannot be
considered an overwhelming, or even complete, success.
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Chapter Four
Failure in Central Africa: The Democratic Republic of Congo
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration intentions in the Democratic Republic of
Congo unraveled in comparison to the state’s regional neighbors Rwanda and Burundi. In the
DRC, regional stability and the curtailing of violence failed, creating an uncertain environment
for the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs. In 1994 over one
million and five hundred thousand Rwandan Hutus and former members of the Forces Armees
Rwandaise crossed the border of Zaire, creating a mini state within the Kivu Province and
destabilizing much of the already vulnerable Eastern region of the country.184 Within the Kivu
Province, genocidaires largely controlled the finances and administration of the makeshift Hutu
settlements, alongside creating recruitment training camps and large weapon stockpiles to
convince the remaining portion of the Hutu population that their return to their homeland would
result in certain death at the hands of the Tutsi’s in power.185 However, prior to the influx of
Rwandan Hutus to the region, Kivu already had experience with conflict exploiting ethnic
tensions as many of the provinces population had undergone massacre and war over who the
land historically belonged to and who should lay claim to its control.186 In 1993, the Hunde and
Nyanga nations in Kivu ordered for the cleansing of the Banyarwanda population, a heinous
action rooted in a long and drawn out history of conflict in the area.187 The massacres and
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violence that plagued the region thus were vulnerable to further destabilization when over one
and a half million Hutu’s from Rwanda arrived. Instability in Zaire, continued conflict against
the Banyarwanda, and genocidaire control over refugee camps in the Kivu Provinces led to
President Paul Kagame of Rwanda’s invasion of the country of Zaire in 1996; igniting a conflict
involving over twenty different rebel groups and the militaries of nine different states.188 The
conflict in Zaire, now presently known as the Democratic Republic of Congo, was not one that
was easily halted by the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
programs. Instead, it is widely accepted by international experts regarding the field of
peacebuilding and development that the Democratic Republic of Congo was a failure and
continues to experience instability in the present day.
The growing conflict in Zaire resulted in the collapse of Kinshasa and the fall of Mobutu
Sese Seko’s dictatorship in May of 1997.189 Despite the severing ethnic tensions and regime
collapse in Zaire, the state did not erode into multiple secessions or succumb to the increasingly
difficult obstacles that its large state capacity created.190 At the fall of Kinshasa, Zaire was
renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo and President Laurent-Desire Kabila retained
governing powers. Kabila’s reign soon exacerbated disagreements with President Paul Kagame
in Rwanda, resulting in the involvement of national regional powers like Uganda, Burundi,
Angola, and Zimbabwe and creating a much larger, pan-African conflict with an increasingly
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destabilized DRC.191 As President Kabila lost his grip of the nation and violence continued in the
Kivu regions, international actors utilized instability in the largest county on the continent for the
opportunity to exploit it for its plentiful and diverse natural resources like cobalt, coltan, copper,
and diamonds. The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo escalated out of control,
inevitably resulting in the assassination of President Kabila in January of 2001 and the
succession of his son, Joseph Kabila, to take control of the executive office.192 As violence
continued, the second president of the Democratic Republic of Congo oversaw the negotiation of
a peace deal in 2002 that created a coalition government including many Congolese faction
representatives and the removal of foreign militaries from the nation’s territory. By 2002, over
three million people had died at the hands of the Congolese Civil War, however, coverage of the
conflict lacked international attention as the West demonstrated disinterest in the unclear enemy
that killed the Congolese primarily through starvation and disease.193 Parties involved in the
conflict came to agreement in 2002 through the South Africa Sun City Peace Accords, which
outlined a path for the country to achieve democratic elections by 2006 and called for the
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of different militant groups across the
Democratic Republic of Congo.194 The peace agreement, too, established a unified Congolese
military known as the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, or the FARDC.195 In
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2002, when the “Program of Implementation of the Peace Agreement Between Rwanda and the
Democratic Republic of Congo on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops the Dismantling of
the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe Forces,” peace in Central Africa seemed attainable.196
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo
began in 2002 as a regional peacebuilding program to combat violence in both the country and
the larger region of the East African Great Lakes.197 The program included funding from the
World Bank International Development Association and thirteen other international partners, and
the coordination of regional governments like the African Union, Rwanda, Uganda, and
Burundi.198 The program established the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration
Program, worked in coordination with the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to
encourage former militants to transition back into the civilian and economic sector through the
Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program.199 This program worked to support
former militants through vocational training, reinsertion packages, reintegration packages, and
the option for combatants to leave their local militant groups and enlist in the state military if
they so desired.200 The reintegration process was implemented in 2002 alongside a disarmament
grant created by the United Nations Development Program of ten million United States Dollars
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and the assistance of the United Nations Children Fund whom oversaw the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration process of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo
whom were largely ignored by the World Bank’s funded program.201
The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program was in operation from
2003 to 2009, receiving over five hundred million dollars in funding for its operation in the Great
Lakes Region.202 Unlike other disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in the
Democratic Republic of Congo after the signing of the South Africa Sun City Peace Accords, the
MDRP included the participation of seven different countries who all participated in the conflict
across the Democratic Republic of Congo during the 1990s and early 2000s.203 These seven
countries – Angola, the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, the Republic of
Congo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo – participated in the oversight and
implementation of the program, resulting in a multi-organizational and inter-governmental
approach to peacebuilding in the region. With specific focus on the demobilization and
reintegration of participating Congolese in the DRC, the MDRP required national oversight of
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, despite receiving funding from
organizations like the World Bank. This posed significant challenges for the Democratic
Republic of Congo, whom after extended periods of conflict and government corruption at the
hands of President Mobutu Sese Seko, suffered from fractured infrastructure and weakened

201

“Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” The World Bank, March 11, 2013.

“The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Final Report: Overview of Program
Achievements,” From the World Bank, July 2010, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated
/en/481721468149096857/pdf/564580WP0MDRP110Box349496B01PUBLIC1.pdf.
202

203

“The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Final Report,” World Bank, July 2010.

64

Grace Marshall
Honors Thesis

institutions.204 With the government struggling to maintain legitimacy in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, the MDRP struggled to receive satisfactory results in comparison to
countries like Rwanda and Burundi, which demonstrated strong state authority and
implementation.
In 2003, there were approximately three hundred thousand militants present in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.205 The Multi-State Demobilization and Reintegration Program’s
goal aimed to transition over one hundred and fifty thousand of those militants into civil society,
and attempted to reinsert the remaining Congolese fighters into the state’s newly unified armed
forces.206 However, by 2008 over seventy thousand individuals still required transitioning; these
individuals specifically coming President Mobutu’s former Presidential Guard, various members
of the Mai-Mai, smaller individual militias, and the Division Speciale Presidentielle (DSP).207
Along with this, individuals who were interested in joining the Armed Forces of the Democratic
Republic of Congo experienced instability as the newly established military became vulnerable
to ethnic and economic divisions among inducted soldiers, as well as human rights violations on
behalf of poor vetting processes for incoming fighters.208 The instability of the military within
the Democratic Republic of Congo in the early 2000s resulted in desertion and fractures within
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the armed forces that contributed to resurgences of violence in territories like the Kivus, Ituri,
and Katanga, where the federal government lacked strength and oversight.209 For those
participating in the MDRP that did not reintegrate into the military, but chose to join the civilian
sector, failure for the government to secure the region from on violence behalf of excluded
armed groups from the peace agreement, resulted in a dangerous environment that encouraged
militant recruiting and resurgence from those who underwent the disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration process but failed to see results.210
The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program in the Great Lakes Region
was one of two DDR programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo after the signage of the
South Africa Sun City Peace Accords in 2002. Although the United Nations worked alongside
the World Bank through UNDP and UNICEF, their prior peacekeeping mission to the
Democratic Republic of Congo also implemented their own program in the region that
transitioned towards a goal of peacebuilding and development. The United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) began implementing a disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration campaign in 2002 in an effort to stabilize the Ituri region of the
DRC where many different armed militia groups had congregated.211 The program included
disarming former militants and requiring participating parties to attend “transit, orientation, and
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regrouping centers.”212 Here, former militants were given the choice between full civilian
reintegration or enlisting the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo, or the
state military of the Democratic Republic of Congo.213 After attending these camps, those
interested in reintegrating into the civilian and economic sector received different resettlement
and reintegration packages. According to the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo’s Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Overview
Report, those who received reintegration and reinsertion packages also received access to “exit
kits, safety nets, transportation, and assistance from the UNDP and UNICEF, whom were also
working alongside the World Bank’s regional stability program.214 This program developed into
what is now known as the Commission Nationale de Demobilisation et Reinsertion (CONADER)
and has continued into the present day, handling the reintegration of over one hundred and fifty
thousand former Congolese militants both reinserting into the state military or civil society. The
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo continued to
function in the DRC through the state’s first democratic elections in nearly half a century in
2006. 215 Despite this achievement, the program continued until 2010 when violence in the
Eastern Regions of the country resulted in the Security Council’s implementation of Resolution
1925, which transformed MONUC to MONUSCO, or the United Nations Organization
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Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.216 Despite the ability for
CONADER to reintegrate nearly one hundred and fifty thousand former Congolese militants, the
program initially has a target population of 366,227 former combatants.217
Notwithstanding their overall failure in curtailing violence in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo resulted in a variety if successes
prior to 2010. According to the World Bank’s report of the program, disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration in the Great Lakes Region brought the following to the DRC…
1. “Approximately 209,605 ex-combatants went through a verification process, 66,814
of whom joined the national army, and 140,000 of whom were demobilized by
March 2011.
2. Surveys suggest 50 percent of ex-combatants have improved their livelihoods since
demobilization, and as of September 2011, 64.7 percent were engaged in productive
economic activity or schooling one year after demobilization.
3. Approximately 31,738 of 39,000 targeted children were removed from armed forces
and reunited with parents by September 2011.
4. A total of 118,459 weapons were collected by September 2011.
5. A total of 821 economic associations were created to catalyze economic growth and
social capital formation by September 2011.
6. Over 80 percent of the demobilized benefited from reintegration assistance.”218
The World Bank’s Report of the performance of the MDRP also indicates that despite its
success in demobilizing and reintegrating a portion of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s
population, the country remained as on of the Fund For Peace’s twenty most at risk countries for
violence in 2007, evaluated through the Fragile State Index.219 In 2009, when the program
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ended, the Democratic Republic of Congo was ranked as the fifth most fragile state worldwide
with a high presence of violence, stagnant economy, and low state legitimacy.220 The MDRP
faced many challenges that resulted in its failure to curb violence in the DRC, but among them,
the weakness of the federal government and the inability for disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration programs in the state to adequately curtail violence in the DRC resulted in a fragile
state that continues to be ranked fifth among the most instable and violent countries
worldwide.221
MONUC’s transition into MONUSCO resulted in the largest current United Nations
peacekeeping force, with a budget of over one billion United States dollars each year.222 Due to
the programs transition, it lacks a clear result on the success that the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration projects created in the region prior to 2010. However, from
2008 to 2012, as the program experienced its transition, the United Nations failed to curtail
violence in the Eastern Region of the DRC as the mission of the disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration program became undefined.223 Lack of direction in their efforts to stabilize the
region resulted in the ignorance of peace accords by various armed groups in regions like Goma,
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while the United Nations also struggled to collaborate with the young Congolese government.224
After the United Nations acknowledged the need to evolve the framework of MONUC in 2010,
MONUSCO transformed from a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration focused
program to one whose main mission was to establish “Stabilization Support Units” throughout
the country.225 These Stabilization Support Units worked with the government of the Democratic
Republic of Congo to establish strong state institutions, a judiciary, and security force.226 This
shift focused the United Nations’ mission on the deterrence of continued violence, rather than
long-term peacebuilding initiatives like DDR. MONUC also faced challenges curbing violence
in the Eastern Region of the DRC due to the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda’s
unwillingness to return to Rwanda after the peace agreement in 2002.227 Their unwillingness to
leave resulted in continued violence, highlighting the importance of an inclusive peace
agreement in cases where federal governments lack strong capacities for control. MONUC and
MDRP failed in their ability to fully reduce violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
which also contributed to a humanitarian crisis as disease and starvation continued across the
country.
The failure for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to
incentivize former combatants to peacefully remain transitioned into civil society or the
Congolese Armed Forces contributed to the continuation of violence throughout the state.
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According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), during 2002, when the Sun City
Peace Accords were signed, 7,877 Congolese lost their lives to state-based violence, non-state
violence, and one-sided violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.228 This is an increase in
comparison to 2001, the year before, in which 1,341 Congolese reportedly lost their lives due to
the continuation of conflict.229 From 2002 to 2008, the number of Congolese casualties from
internal conflict decreased, with 1,736 individuals reported dead in 2008.230 However, in 2007,
only 880 Congolese lost their lives to the violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which
demonstrates that as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations began to falter,
acts of aggression increased. This is also noticeable in the Fragile State Index. Although the
index did not begin reporting until 2005, and thus does not include measurements regarding the
Democratic Republic of Congo’s fragility in the first three years of the implementation of DDR
programs, it does indicate that in the last two years of the operations the country increased in its
ranking, going from the sixth most instable state in 2007 to the fifth in 2008.231 This instability
has only continued throughout the twenty-first century, as the Fragile State Index’s current
report on the Democratic Republic of Congo ranks the nation fifth in fragility. The presence of
violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo has failed to halt, despite the attempts made by
the United Nations and the World Bank through the implementation of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration.
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For the purpose of this specific investigation and overall understanding of the factors that
contribute to successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, the
Democratic Republic of Congo aligns well with the four hypotheses proposed in the first chapter
of this study. Although the Sun City Peace Accords were signed in 2002, initiating the
establishment of a DDR program in the state, the institutions required to carry out disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration required a year to develop.232 This posed challenges to the
program prior to its inauguration.233 CONADER, the national institution developed to oversee
civilian disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, was not fully formed or present in each
province of the DRC until December of 2003, almost two years after the signage of the initial
peace agreement. In this case, had the program seen rapid implementation it is likely that it
would have been more successful in its ability to transition former militants into civil society, as
peace would have been fresh in the minds of armed organizations and the continuation of
conflict would have been less visible throughout the nation. The Democratic Republic of
Congo’s DDR program also demonstrates the importance of the inclusion of all participants in
the process. Members of the Mai-Mai, former Hutu genocidaires and Interahamwe from Rwanda
living in the Congo, and the formal Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, refused to
participate in the demobilization process.234 As a result, conflict within the state continued from
2003 to 2008 and the safety of reintegrated Congolese could not be guaranteed by the
government.
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The inability for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process to be
inclusive of all conflicting groups in the state further contributed to the operation’s inability to
provide strong vocational training that incentivized former combatants from resurgence.
Although fifty percent of those who participated in the DDR process within the Democratic
Republic of Congo managed to increase their quality of life, the remaining fifty did not manage
to see the same benefits.235 Many of the former combatants who received vocational training of
employment support from the United Nations, the World Bank, or CONADER, did not receive a
large enough income to support their needs or the needs of their family.236 Along with this,
participants of the program were often unqualified for the jobs that they received, as the
vocational training program demonstrated to lack strength and robustness.237 Overall, each
dimension also did not receive adequate funding, and delays in the financing for each operation
was often delayed, infrequent, and not flexible. 238 Thus, the disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo seemed to show signs of failure from the
beginning. Although the successes that resulted from the operation should not go unnoticed, the
program required stronger provisions and serious attention for it to serve as a viable solution to
the discontinuation of violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Overall, the Democratic Republic of Congo serves as an example of a fragile state in
which disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs failed to effectively end

235

“Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” The World Bank, March 11, 2013.

“Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Reform of the Army,”
Amnesty International Report (2007): 17.
236

“Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Reform of the Army,”
Amnesty International Report (2007): 17.
237

“Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Reform of the Army,”
Amnesty International Report (2007): 7.
238

73

Grace Marshall
Honors Thesis

violence and result in stabilization. Both programs lacked the strong state oversight that countries
like Burundi and Rwanda had the privilege of, resulting in disorganization within reintegration
programs and lack of protection for transitioned militants who easily defaulted back into
resurgence. Along with this, divisions within the Congolese military and lack of control
regarding the reintegration of former militants into the armed forces resulted in alienation among
different factions of combatants and ethnic groups, who often deserted or also defaulted into
combat.239 Failure for the MDRP and MONUC to vet individual interested in joining the Armed
Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo also resulted in human rights abusers gaining
regional power and control through the military, further contributing to the increased violence in
the state.240 For those who did not reintegration into the military, the United Nation’s and World
Bank’s inability to secure the regions in which civilian Congolese lived and were reintegrated
into resulted in violence and humanitarian crises like hunger and disease, resulting in a
population of individuals who became more susceptible to violence and continued conflict.241
Much of the failure of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Democratic
Republic of Congo can also be attributed to the country’s failure to include all warring parties in
the peace agreement in 2002, which failed to fully curtail conflict as different rebel and militia
factions continued their insurgency against the government, specifically in the Eastern Regions
of the state.242
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Failure for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in the Democratic
Republic of Congo to be holistic in their approach strongly influences the continuation of
conflict in the state. Today, the Democratic Republic of Congo continued to be ranked the fifth
most fragile state in the world with only Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria ranked above
it according to the Fragile State Index.243 Failure to cease violence in the region has resulted in
low government legitimacy, a failing economy, and a humanitarian crisis. With the help of
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs the government has managed to slowly
increase its regional control, however, due to the fragility and instability within the nation reports
of mass rapes, massacres, starvation, and disease continue into the present day.244 Failure for the
country to adopt sustainable development projects as a result of its consistent history of violence
further contribute to the state’s inability to end violence through disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration programs, as former militants do not have a strong economic motivation to
reinsert into civilian life. Overall, the failure for a strong and holistic disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration program to be implemented in 2002 through MONUC and
MDRP contributed to the continued instability within the country. Failure to include all
members of the warring parties and a lack of a strong state government oversight, resulted in the
overall inability for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to succeed at
curtailing violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the early 2000s.
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Chapter Five:
Comparative Analysis of DDR in Rwanda, Burundi, and
the Democratic Republic of Congo
According for the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program’s report on
Former Militants in Burundi, reintegrated soldiers commonly reported that they chose to
participate in the war due to their anger and fear of insecurity, ideological principals, or their
current state of poverty.245 Misery, poverty, and threats of insecurity largely went unchecked by
the state, and many Burundians were recruited into militant groups and organizations like that
FAB with the promise that their quality of life would only increase as a result. In one interview
conducted by the World Bank’s Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, a
young unemployed man explained that his enlistment into the FAB was the result of his father’s
death and his mother’s inability to find work. As a result, the family could no longer provide for
each other, unable to pay for food and meet the financial requirement of school fees.246 The
young man felt that he no longer had a choice to remain a bystander in the Civil War, as
crippling poverty drove him to fight on the side of the FAB rather than any ideological
arguments.247 Although the pressures of insecurity and poverty drove many individuals into a
conflict they did not believe in, the promises that military service and militant action included
was a strong enough incentive for them to stay. As Burundi struggled with conflict up until the
late 1990s, many of the later demobilized former combatants felt that transitioning into civilian
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live was impossible.248 Thus, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs within
the state needed to demonstrate that the transition was not only a possibility, but it would lead to
a better future. Although Burundi demonstrated moderate success at deterring violence through
the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, for the former
militants who did receive the support of the government have noticed and increase to their
quality of life. For example, on former combatants interviewed by the World Bank explained that
with the financial support of the government and the education the individual received through
his demobilization process, he managed to buy additional land and livestock, investing in long
term benefits to assist his family’s needs and provide economic security for himself.249
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, when successful, contribute to the
stabilization of a nation, the reduction of violence and human suffering, and can positively
contribute to economic development and the betterment of the standard of living in communities
throughout the region.
In Eastern Africa, violence in the states of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo were not only heinous, but occurred in some of the most vulnerable
communities in the world. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, many individuals face the
hardships of malnutrition, exposure to disease, and extreme destitution in addition to threats of
insecurity, violence, insufficient access to resources, and vulnerability to crime and militant
activity. In Burundi, communities face high levels of population density and poverty, as the
World Bank estimates that in 2019 roughly 1.77 million people living in the state required
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humanitarian assistance.250 Exposure to political violence and repression also plagues the state,
which is in part the result of the weak enforcement of peacebuilding agreements, like the Arusha
Accords. Of the three case studies, Rwanda has fared the best, as the development of strong
institutions and social safety nets have contributed to the state’s consistent increase in economic
growth over the last two decades.251 For the region, Rwanda has become a demonstration of
economic and social stability in the wake of one of the worst tragedies of mankind; yet,
internationally the state is still considered a member of the developing world with an average per
capita income of 1,343 United States Dollars and a poverty rate of 39.1%, with 16.3% of the
country’s population living on less than two dollars a day.252 The establishment of strong and
withstanding disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in these three states
proved to be vital to the attempts to end human suffering and strengthen civil society so that
communities have a chance at a prosperous future. Disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration programs have changed the lives of hundreds of thousands of individuals in Eastern
and Central Africa, and although all of the operations in this region have not seen promising
measures of success, those that have benefitted from the process experience stability and support
from their government, and provide peace of mind to members of civil society searching for
security amongst an environment of brutal chaos.

“The World Bank in Burundi: Overview,” The World Bank, accessed April 16, 2020. https://www.worldbank.org
/en/country/burundi/overview.
250

“The World Bank in Rwanda: Overview,” The World Bank, accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.worldbank.org
/en/country/rwanda/overview.
251

“About Rwanda,” United Nations Development Program, accessed April 16, 2020, https://www.rw.undp.org
/content/rwanda/en/home/countryinfo.html.
252

78

Grace Marshall
Honors Thesis

In Rwanda, the demobilization and reintegration operations conducted to transition
former combatants into civil society resulted in a complete halt on violence in the state by
2006.253 The success of peacebuilding efforts to reduce the presence of conflict within the state
allowed for former militants to successfully reintegrated into the economy and provided long
term incentives for participants of the program to choose the long-term path of peace. As
“Chapter Two – Rwanda: Light in the Mists of Darkness” suggests, the framework of their stateoperated demobilization and reintegration program serves as a successful case study to evaluate
when seeking to understand the factors that contribute to a strong approach to DDR in Eastern
and Central Africa. Rwanda is regarded as being successful due to the states ability to provide
participants with a robust reeducation program, known as ingando, and intensive vocational
curriculums with the temporary financial support for reintegrated individuals on behalf of the
Rwandan Government, the United Nations and the World Bank.254 The success of
demobilization and reintegration within the state can also be attributed to the adequate amount of
funding that Rwanda received for its peacebuilding projects. During the Rwandan Civil War and
the subsequent Genocide, the international community largely failed to assist the state in any
efforts to halt the continuation of the massacres and mass amounts of human suffering. The
greatest loss of life in the shortest amount of time in human history, the murder of over eight
hundred thousand Rwandans in the genocide left organizations like the United Nations with a
feeling of perpetual guilt for their inaction and ignorance. Thus, peacebuilding efforts through
mechanisms like demobilization and reintegration within Rwanda experienced a steady flow of
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funding that was flexible for the project’s needs, as the state government under the new
leadership of the Rwandan Patriotic Force had a hand in the implementation and operation of
these institutions. Of the case studies explored in this qualitative analysis, Rwanda serves as a
demonstration of the success of demobilization and reintegration, despite the inevitable
challenges the program faced in the uncertain environment created in state’s after experiencing
conflict.
One case study that serves as a moderately successful, yet still flawed example of a
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program in Central and Eastern Africa occurred
in Burundi. As mentioned in “Chapter Three – Good, but Not Good Enough: DDR in Burundi,”
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Burundi only managed to reintegrate
one-third of the target population of fifty-five thousand individuals. Although the program
provided strong reintegration packages for participants and offered five strong vocational
pathways to transition back into the formal economy, funding for the program proved to the
instable and infrequent. The stoppage of funding on the international level resulted in the
inability for the DDR institutions to consistently operate, so despite the high quality reeducation
and reintegration programs in the Burundi operations, the lack of consistency and inadequate
funding resulted in a small carrying capacity for former combatants. Burundi serves as a strong
demonstration for the consequences of inadequate funding and the challenges of international
bureaucracy, as these problems have largely contributed to the lack of attention for the two-thirds
of the target population that never demobilized. Violence did subside in Burundi between the
beginning of the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations
and the conclusion of the program in 2007. Despite this, violence from the state and non-state
actors against the civilian population was still present, regardless of its decrease. The resurgence
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of violence in the state and growing political instability beginning with democratic erosion in
2015 also demonstrates the weaknesses in the peacebuilding process within the state, as the
failure of the Arusha Accords to serves as a constitutional safeguard on democracy in the state
can largely be attributed to the lack of enforcement and criticism on the Burundian government
from the international community. Thus, as political instability increases in Burundi in the
present day, so does criticism on the country’s peacebuilding projects that failed to prevent the
eruption of any type of conflict in the future.
Despite the shortcomings of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Burundi,
within Central and Eastern Africa the Democratic Republic of Congo serves as the strongest
example of a failed disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program. In this comparative
analysis, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration initiatives in the Democratic Republic
of Congo experienced an increasing number of flaws when equated to the peacebuilding
programs operating in Burundi and Rwanda. Although the instability and conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo was unique in comparison to Rwanda and Burundi, as
chronologically is began later and continued on despite the piloting of peacebuilding projects,
some of the program’s failure can be attributed to the design of disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration. Although the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration within the Democratic Republic of Congo was heavily assisted by the United
Nations and the World Bank, the program received infrequent and inadequate funding, similar to
that of Burundi. However, the programs initiated in the Democratic Republic of Congo did not
provide strong reintegration packages of vocational training, as many of the former combatants
who transitioned through the operations reported that they did not receive suitable financial
support from the government to assist in their reintegration and felt that they were unqualified
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for the jobs they were assigned. Former combatants experienced difficulty through their
transition into civil society and felt unsupported economically, resulting in strong incentives to
default back into militant activities. The state failed to provide security for those who were
reintegrated as well, further contributing to the probable possibility for resurgence of violence
throughout the state. Despite these problems, the program was doomed from the beginning.
Within the Democratic Republic of Congo, every participating party within the state was not
included in the development of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plans, and
therefore many combatants demonstrated disinterest and resistance to the process from the very
beginning. During the period in which disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration was
initially implemented in the state, fluctuations to the rate of state-based, non-state, and one-sided
violence in the state resulted in further instability. The Democratic Republic of Congo serves as
an example of the consequences of weak disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
programs through the continued violence experienced throughout the country and the
corresponding Fragile State Index ranking as the fifth most instable state in the world.
This comparative analysis investigated the disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration programs for former militants in three Eastern and Central African countries. These
three states were chosen as the case studies for this investigation due to their shared similarities
in the nature of their conflicts, their mutual inclusion in the Multi-Country Demobilization and
Reintegration Program in the Great Lakes Region, and their influence on study of peacebuilding
and post-conflict development mechanisms within the wider community of Conflict
Management Studies and Global Governance. The Republic of Rwanda, the Republic of
Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo serve as strong subjects for the understanding
of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs due to their varying levels of
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success, despite receiving similar attention from partners within the international community like
the United Nations, the World Bank’s International Development Association, and the African
Union. Today, the effects of the peacebuilding projects in these three nations have created very
different results, as the presence of conflict at the end of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration in each state varies between the three and their present stability is also quite
different among the case studies. From this investigation, it has been determined that
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants effectively halted conflict
in the Republic of Rwanda, was only moderately effective at reducing violence in the Republic
of Burundi, and failed in the Democratic Republic of Congo in its efforts to curb violence and
incentivize militants to remain reintegrated into civil society and removed from militia activity.
Although measurements on the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
programs on the reduction of violence within these three Eastern and Central African states was
important to the outcome of this investigation, this project sought to further understand the
factors within the framework of these DDR programs that contributed to their success or failure.
To further understand the characteristics that showed to have a large contribution on the ability
for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to reduce or halt the presence of
violence, the comparative analysis examined four specific hypotheses.
A. Results
This comparative analysis aimed to analyze four specific hypotheses regarding the factors
that contribute to the ability for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to
reduce of deter conflict within each state. For reference, those hypotheses are stated below…
1. Disarmament programs are more likely to be successful in their contribution to
deterring conflict if they are implemented within a year after the peace agreement.
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Disarmament programs are also more likely to be successful if more than a
majority of arms in the nation are collected and the majority of combatants are
disarmed.
2. Demobilization programs are more likely to be successful in their contribution to
deterring conflict if all parties privy to the conflict are bound to the peace accords
and uphold their responsibilities throughout the mandate.
3. Reintegration programs are more likely to be successful to their contributions to
deterring conflict if the vocational training is of high quality. Along with this,
reintegration programs are more likely to be successful if a majority of disarmed
and demobilized combatants are enrolled and graduate from this vocational
training.
4. The overall success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
programs is likely if each dimension is adequately funded. 255
Overall, I argued that these sub-hypotheses are the result of a holistic approach to disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration programs in which each dimension is equally emphasized for
its cruciality to the overall success of the program. However, through the examination of each
case study and the programs they implemented, I can conclude that the success of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration is not necessarily equated to equal implementation of each
dimension. Along with this, a holistic approach to DDR did not demonstrate to be imperative to
the success of the programs at deterring or reducing conflict, as Rwanda’s operation lacked any
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form of disarmament. Aside from this conclusion, of the four sub-hypotheses proposed at the
start of the investigation only three withstand the results of the analysis.
Through a comparative analysis of the disarmament programs in Rwanda, Burundi, and
the Democratic Republic of Congo, it can be concluded that the time period between the signage
of the peace accord and the implementation of disarmament did not demonstrate to show
significant effects on the ability of DDR to reduce violence within the state. Along with this,
although the collection of weapons is often crucial for the success of disarmament within postconflict environments, each of the three states analyzed in this study demonstrated varying
results on the success of disarmament, regardless of the presence of violence. In Rwanda, where
DDR was largely a success due to its ability to halt violence within the state, a formal
disarmament program was never implemented. As stated in “Chapter Two,” disarmament in
Rwanda was never employed as a peacebuilding mechanism due to the continuing existence of
ethnic tension among the Hutus and Tutsis after the end of the genocide.256 The Rwanda
Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, along with the assistance of the United Nations
and World Bank, did not require former combatants to disarm prior to demobilizing. This was
attributed to the distrust of the Hutu population toward the Rwandan Patriotic Force run
government, where the consensus among DDR participating Hutus was that if they disarmed
they would become at risk to a retaliation from the Tutsis on behalf of the government, similarly
to the events that transpired in Burundi.257 Thus, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration
Commission did not require the collection of weapons prior to former combatants entrance into
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demobilization programs. In Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, provisions
regarding disarmament were different than their predecessor. The government of Burundi
successfully collected over 5,600 weapons from former combatants in the state under the
supervision of the United Nations Operations in Burundi, who then became responsible for the
destruction and disposal of these arms.258 Despite efforts to disarm combatants in Burundi, the
time period between the signage of the Arusha Accords and the implementation of disarmament
did not demonstrate a significant influence on the success of reducing violence in the state.
Similarly, disarmament efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo resulted in the collection of
118,459 weapons throughout the state, however, the presence of violence and the probability of
disarmed combatants defaulting back into conflict remained high throughout the country.259
Along with this, the establishment of CONADER in the state was not until December of 2003,
coming two years after the signing of the South Africa Sun City Peace Accords.260 The time in
which disarmament is implemented and the program’s ability to collect weapons from former
combatants is important for the success of DDR, however, this comparative analysis highlights
that it does not serve as a crucial component of successful reducing violence throughout each
state.
Although the first hypothesis for this investigation, relating to disarmament, did not
demonstrate to significantly influence the success of DDR programs at reducing or halting
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conflict, the other three hypotheses presented in the introduction to this comparative analysis did
significantly influence the effectiveness of each operation. In Rwanda and Burundi, the
inclusion of the warring parties presents in the conflict within the peace agreement significantly
influenced the willingness of former combatants to participate in demobilization or reinsertion
programs. In Burundi, nineteen parties participated in the 2000 Arusha Accords, with the only
exception being the FNL, who’s continued their militant campaign throughout the state until
their own peace agreement was signed with the Burundian national government in 2006.261 The
exclusion of the FNL in the 2000 Arusha Agreement accounts for the continuation of minor acts
of guerrilla violence in the state after 2003. The shortcomings of DDR in Burundi are not
equated to the necessary exclusion of the FNL from the peace accords, but rather, the inadequate
and inconsistency of funding that will be further discussed in the remainder of this conclusion. In
the Democratic Republic of Congo, exclusion of warring parties in the peace agreement and
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process demonstrated outstanding challenges for
the success of the program at curtailing violence. The exclusion of the Mai-Mai, former
Rwandan Hutu genocidaires, the Interahamwe, and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda from the agreement to implement disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
resulted in CONADER’s inability to transition former combatants into civil society without
threats of resurgence. Many of these individuals, if willing to demobilize, would participate in an
effort to seek the reintegration benefits from the state and international organizations and then
would divert back to conflict. Along with this, the continuation of violence in the state, as a
result of the failure to establish ceasefire, resulted in the program’s insecurity. The importance of
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the inclusion of participants within the conflict in the implementation of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration programs is further supported by this comparative analysis, as
Rwanda and Burundi experienced success and the Democratic Republic of Congo failed to
maintain peace in the region.
The success of reintegration programs and the strength of the benefits that they provide
are vital to incentivizing former militants from defaulting into militant behavior or the
continuation of conflict in the future. Of the three stages of DDR programs, this comparative
analysis highlights the importance of a strong reintegration curriculum and program support. In
Rwanda, robust reeducation programs are partly attributed to the success of the Rwanda
Demobilization and Reintegration Commission at curtailing violence in the state. In Rwanda,
ingando contributed to the reduction of ethnic tension among the Hutu and Tutsi populations,
and assisted in the redevelopment of a national Rwandan identity that was well removed from
the former manipulations of Belgian colonialism.262 Alongside the ingando education, the
Rwandan government provided job placements for individuals who continued through the
reintegration process in the redevelopment of formerly destroyed infrastructure, offering an
employment incentive as a means to stabilize the nation and prevent the eruption of further
conflict. In Burundi, robust reintegration packages resulted in the state’s assistance to the
financial support of 19,739 former militants. Although this was roughly only one-third of the
program’s target population, reintegration in Burundi provided comprehensive vocational
training and five avenues of employment for former combatants that participated in the process.
The government of Burundi also aided with the families and dependents of former militants in
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the state, demonstrating the program’s commitment to robust resettlement packages. Despite the
state’s inability to reintegrate two-thirds of their target population, those that did participate in
demobilization received benefits and strong support from the National Commission of
Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration. Of the three case studies, the Democratic
Republic of Congo highlights the importance of robust vocational training curriculums and
government support through reintegration. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
government failed to provide employment opportunities for participants in the process and
benefits packages that could support former militants and provide a steady income through their
transition. The lack of resources and development of reintegration in the Democratic Republic of
Congo created a weak safety net for individuals participating in the process, and did not serve as
a competitive incentive for the deterrence of violence in comparison to the benefits and income
that militant groups were providing. Had reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo
been well supported and developed, the incentives for former militants to resurge into conflict
would have been minimal in comparison to the choice of peace.
Despite the successes or shortcomings of each dimension of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration in Central and Eastern Africa, the amount of funding each
program received did influence the strength of each operation at deterring violence in the state.
However, funding demonstrated to only dramatically influence the success of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration programs if it is overwhelmingly controlled by the state and
thus is flexible. In Rwanda, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission was not
only well funded by the remaining resources of the national government, but the program also
received strong support from the international community who previously neglected the state
despite their tragedy. In Rwanda, demobilization and reintegration efforts effectively reduced
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violence in part because they were well funded and were able to support the financial burden of
former militants; the state even benefited from their participation as former combatants entered
the work force through infrastructure development projects. Burundi did not experience the same
success Rwanda did regarding financial support. One of the largest reasons Burundi only
successfully transitioned one third of their target population was due to the state’s inability to
support the other two thirds in the process. Inconsistent funding resulted in the stoppage of
demobilization facilities and disarmament programs, causing uncertainty in the program’s ability
to carry the targeted fifty-five thousand individuals. Lack of funding came on behalf of the
international community, as fluctuation in the willingness for members states to support
peacebuilding efforts in the Republic of Burundi was never fully guaranteed due to the
limitations of global governance and the weak enforcement of international agreements.
However, although Burundi’s DDR program received inadequate funding from the international
community, the state’s control over the finances of the program allowed for flexibility in the
money’s use. In comparison, low levels of the state’s control of funding in the Democratic
Republic of Congo created instability within the program, creating insufficient funding and
inflexible cash flow. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, however, the extraneous factors such
as the weakness of the national government also influenced the inability for the program to be
adequately funded. In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, low funding for
reintegration benefits resulted in very little incentives for former militants to remain peaceful in
the presence of financial opportunities in militant action. Thus, funding demonstrates to be
crucial to the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs; however, this
is too simple.
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It is obvious that adequate funding for any peacebuilding or post-conflict development
project would be critical to the success of the operation. Although this comparative analysis
demonstrates this in action, it also highlights that one key to the success of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration program funding in the strength of the state’s control over the
operation. In Rwanda, the state’s control over the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration
Commission resulted in a reduction of bureaucracy and decreased reliance on the instability of
international aid. The Burundi National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and
Reintegration also was a state run enterprise that controlled the disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration process – however, the state relied heavily on international funding that was
not consistently available for the nation in comparison to Rwanda. In reality, the willingness for
the international community to provide Rwanda consistent funding and their unwillingness to
match the same in Burundi accounts for some of the variations among both programs’ success. In
comparison to Burundi and Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo represents the
importance of the creation of a transitional government and the subsequent state control that
follows it. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the state government lacked strong control over
the operation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; the state also lacked the
resources to fund the program, resulting in the reliance on the international community partners
like the World Bank and United Nations who demonstrated inconsistency and thinly spread
resources. Although this study attempts to simplify the factors that contribute to the success of
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, the complexities of each program demonstrate
that other influences might be at play. In further research, I plan to understand the relationship
between the establishment of transitional governments and disarmament, demobilization, and
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reintegration programs to investigate the possible solutions to the challenges that weak
governance poses on peacebuilding operations.
B. Discussion
Overall, this comparative analysis demonstrated that of the four hypotheses proposed in the
introduction of this investigation, the inclusion of all participating parties in the peace agreement,
the robustness of reintegration programs and vocational trainings, and adequate funding are more
important to the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs than the
time in which they take to be implemented. None of the three programs were implemented
within a year of the peace agreement, which highlights the lack of importance of this prediction
in comparison to the other three. The results of the three programs is listed below, to aid in the
ability to understanding the successes and shortcomings of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration in each state.

Individuals Transitioned Through DDR
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
The Republic of
Rwanda

The Republic of
Burundi

Target Population of Former Combatants

The Democratic
Republic of Congo

Number of Individuals Reintegrated

In Rwanda, the percentage of former militants that were successfully reintegrated through the
DDR process was 128%, demonstrating the that program managed to carry an extra 12,538
individuals that were not initially anticipated to participate. In Burundi, 36% of the anticipated
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former militant population participated in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the
state, leaving 64%, or 35,261 individuals from the target population unattended to. In the
Democratic Republic of Congo, the number of former combatants that were processed is much
higher than in Burundi and Rwanda, however, only 58% of the target population in the
Democratic Republic of Congo was actually reintegrated. This percentage, although higher than
Burundi’s, does not account for the number of individuals who defaulted into violence after
participating in reintegration and the high levels of violence within the state that ceased to
decrease despite disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts.
The various levels of success in the crusade to deter or halt conflict in each of these
nations through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, could have also been influenced
by other factors. Although this comparative analysis investigates the variations between
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration policy, the variables influencing these programs
success are difficult, if not impossible, to completely isolate. Extraneous factors like the nature
of each conflict, the size of each state, the strength of national governments, and the state of
economic development each nation experiences can influence the effectiveness of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration at curtailing violence. In Rwanda, rapid economic growth
created a robust economy for citizens to enter – assisting in the east of reintegration’s
implementation in the state. Initially considered a Low Income Country (LIC), Rwanda is
currently categorized as a Middle-Income Country (MIC) after the implementation of two
“Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies.” In comparison, failure in the
Democratic Republic of Congo is reflective of other factors within the state that create
vulnerability to violence. The sheer size of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in comparison to
Rwanda and Burundi, poses challenges to the consolidation of power for the national
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government. Along with this, the weakness of the national government required disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration in the state to be externally overseen by organizations like the
United Nations and the World Bank who lack local knowledge of community needs.263
International organizations, like the United Nations and World Bank, are necessary to the
implementation of these programs, however just receiving their support is insufficient. Instead,
strong collaboration between the state and international institutions is requires for successful
implementation. In Rwanda, strong government control by one party, the Rwandan Patriotic
Front, influenced the ability for the state to have strong control over the former combatants in the
state. The conflict’s clear winner, the RPF, thus instituted peacebuilding with full control. In
Burundi, the opposite is true. Perhaps one of the reasons that their program was only moderately
successful despite their ability to curb violence is due to patients in the creation of a transitional
government and the establishment of an ethnically balanced military. Alongside these factors, the
Democratic Republic of Congo is one of the largest states in Africa, in comparison to the smaller
nations of Burundi and Rwanda, who have dramatically smaller populations and more cultural
homogeny.
In these three states, it is also important to understand that all three conflicts are
interconnected, and therefore, cannot be studied in isolation. The success of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration in Rwanda served as an example for the operations in Burundi
and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although Burundi and the Democratic Republic of
Congo did not demonstrate the same successes that Rwanda did, the design and implementation
of their programs were largely modeled after the institutions in state’s operation. Along with this,
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the conflicts within each state were interconnected, as the mass exodus of Hutu genocidaires,
Interahamwe, and the Hutu militants fled Rwanda and Burundi, and resettled in the Democratic
Republic of Congo where they fuel much of the conflict. Outbreaks of violence in Burundi in the
early 2000s were often the result of former Burundian and Rwandan Hutu genocidaires living in
the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo retaliating against the young
government. The legacies of ethnic violence within these three states has strongly influenced the
outbreak of violence and the ability for each nation to reach peace, resulting in the inability for
these three cases of conflict to be studies in isolation from one another.
This comparative analysis demonstrates the success of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration programs at decreasing the presence of violence in Eastern and Central Africa. The
success of programs like these are vital around the world, as they improve security throughout
the globe and increase the quality of life among some of the most destitute and vulnerable
populations of all. This study highlights the need for change in the framework of peacebuilding
projects in states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, which still remains the fifth most
fragile state across the globe, only to follow Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria. Failure of
these programs influenced the lives of millions of individuals worldwide, like Divine, a seventytwo-year-old woman living in fear of rape, extreme poverty, and the uncertain future of her
family.264 The importance of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration surpasses the lives
of participants in armed conflict, but stretches to the safety, security, and stability of
communities across that world that have experienced tragedies that are incomprehensible for
individuals who have never had to witness them. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
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operations in post-conflict environments can serve as a beacon of hope for individuals suffering
from the presence of violence, only if they are effectively implemented.
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